Affordable techniques for dependable microprocessor design by Kim, Seongwoo
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2001
Affordable techniques for dependable
microprocessor design
Seongwoo Kim
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Electrical and Electronics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kim, Seongwoo, "Affordable techniques for dependable microprocessor design " (2001). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 650.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/650
INFORMATION TO USERS 
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UM1 films 
the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and 
dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of 
computer printer. 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations 
and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. 
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing 
from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. 
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing 
in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. 
ProQuest Information and Learning 
300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor. Ml 48106-1346 USA 
800-521-0600 

Affordable Techniques for Dependable Microprocessor Design 
by 
Seongwoo Kim 
A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Major: Computer Engineering 
Program of Study Committee: 
Arun K. Somani, Major Professor 
Suraj C. Kothari 
Gyungho Lee 
Jo Min 
Akhilesh Tyagi 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
2001 
Copyright © Seongwoo Kim, 2001. All rights reserved. 
UMI Number. 3034195 
Copyright 2001 by 
Kim, Seongwoo 
All rights reserved. 
UMI" 
UMI Microform 3034195 
Copyright 2002 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. 
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 
ii 
Graduate College 
Iowa State University 
This is to certify that the Doctoral dissertation of 
Seongwoo Kim 
has met the dissertation requirements of Iowa State University 
aj essor 
Major Program 
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
iii 
DEDICATION 
In memory of my father, Woonki 
IV 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xi 
ABSTRACT xii 
CHAPTER 1 Introduction 1 
1.1 Background 1 
1.2 Fault Tolerance Techniques 3 
1.3 Our Research Goals 5 
CHAPTER 2 Soft Error Susceptibility of the picoJava-II processor .... 7 
2.1 Processor Fault Behavior 7 
2.2 Soft Error Characterization through Fault Injection Methods 8 
2.3 PicoJava-II Core Architecture 10 
2.4 Experimental Setup 12 
2.5 Soft Error Sensitivity of the PicoJava-II 18 
2.5.1 Integer unit 18 
2.5.2 Instruction cache 24 
2.5.3 Data cache 26 
2.5.4 FPU, SMU, PCSU, BIU, and MEMC 28 
2.5.5 FUB-level SES 31 
2.6 Summary 32 
CHAPTER 3 Integrity Checking Architectures for Memory Arrays . . . .  3 3  
3.1 Conventional Memory Protection 33 
V 
3.2 Errors in Cache and Their Effects 35 
3.3 New Architectural Approaches 37 
3.3.1 Parity caching 38 
3.3.2 Shadow checking 42 
3.3.3 Selective checking 44 
3.3.4 Cache scrubbing 46 
3.4 Error Model and Evaluation Methodology 46 
3.5 Results and Analysis 49 
3.5.1 The performance of parity caching 49 
3.5.2 The performance of shadow checking 53 
3.5.3 The performance of selective checking 54 
3.6 Summary 54 
CHAPTER 4 Cache Write Verification in Multi-Level Caching Systems . . 57 
4.1 Importance of Initial Data Transfer 57 
4.2 Motivation 59 
4.3 Baseline Architecture 60 
4.4 Instruction and Data Verification 61 
4.5 Evaluation Methodology 64 
4.6 Simulation Results 66 
4.6.1 Effect of secondary memory type 66 
4.6.2 Effect of LI cache size 68 
4.6.3 Effect of WSQ size 70 
4.6.4 Effect of bus management and degree of pipeline 71 
4.7 Summary 72 
CHAPTER 5 On-Line Integrity Checking for Control Logic 74 
5.1 Processor and Fault Model 74 
5.2 Integrity Checking Strategy 75 
5.2.1 Static control protection 77 
vi 
5.2.2 Dynamic control protection 79 
5.2.3 Control flow monitoring 80 
5.3 Evaluation Methodology 81 
5.4 Experiment Results 83 
5.5 Summary 85 
CHAPTER 6 System Level Fault Tolerance for Superscalar Processors . . 87 
6.1 Virtual Duplex System 87 
6.2 Fault Manifestation in Microprocessors 88 
6.3 SSD: Selective Series Duplex Architecture 89 
6.4 Evaluation Environment 93 
6.5 Cost Reduction and Performance Impact 95 
6.6 Summary 98 
CHAPTER 7 Future Work 100 
CHAPTER 8 Concluding Remarks 101 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 103 
vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1 FIT (failures in 109hours) increase of a SRAM cache in scaling IC pro­
cess technology generation 2 
Figure 2.1 Block diagram of the picoJava-II 12 
Figure 2.2 Transparent software interface for fault injection 13 
Figure 2.3 Fault injection and observation timing diagram 17 
Figure 2.4 The SES of the integer unit (IU) when FID = 1 20 
Figure 2.5 Possible logical positions of a FIL and their impacts on the sensitivity. 21 
Figure 2.6 The SES of the integer unit when FID = 10 23 
Figure 2.7 The SES check for non-critical sub-blocks by extending the FID to 500 
clocks 24 
Figure 2.8 The SES of the I-cache 25 
Figure 2.9 The SES of the D-cache 27 
Figure 2.10 The SES of the remaining FUBs 30 
Figure 2.11 The functional unit blocks of the picoJava-II 31 
Figure 3.1 Cache data state transition 36 
Figure 3.2 A 16KB D-cache and a parity cache 39 
Figure 3.3 Check code area model 40 
Figure 3.4 Relative area requirement 42 
Figure 3.5 Shadow checking architecture 43 
Figure 3.6 Relative area ratio 44 
Figure 3.7 Uniform vs. selective organization 45 
viii 
Figure 3.8 Error propagation rate (EPR) 50 
Figure 3.9 Error removal 52 
Figure 3.10 Effects of other parameters 53 
Figure 3.11 EPR under shadow checking 54 
Figure 3.12 EPR under selective checking 55 
Figure 4.1 Baseline architecture for the cache write sure scheme 61 
Figure 4.2 A timing diagram example of instruction verification 63 
Figure 4.3 Effect of half queue verification cycle time on I-cache 67 
Figure 4.4 Effect of Tfiv in accordance with three L2 types associated with D-cache. 68 
Figure 4.5 Effect of the cache size: (a) I-cache. (b) D-cache 69 
Figure 4.6 Effect of WSQ size: (a) I-cache. (b) D-cache (each column of a bench­
mark indicates a different number of entries in the WSQ) 70 
Figure 5.1 An example of control signal error propagation in a processor pipeline. 75 
Figure 5.2 Impact of control signal errors on pipelined instruction executions: (a) 
a sample program segment and (b) control flow deviated by a CFE in 
the base processor pipeline executing the example code (a) 76 
Figure 5.3 Signature of static control signals: (a) pipelined signature generation 
and (b) an example of signature computation with an erroneous static 
control signal 78 
Figure 5.4 Block diagram of IA-based CFM hardware 80 
Figure 5.5 Fault coverage for the benchmarks: outcome distribution also shows 
error detection coverage 84 
Figure 6.1 Transient fault manifested in a logic output of a processor chip 88 
Figure 6.2 (a) A conventional fault tolerant processor with a dual CPU core, (b) 
Fault tolerance using re-execution through a single multithreading pro­
cessor core 90 
Figure 6.3 Selective series duplication (SSD) 91 
ix 
Figure 6.4 An example of instruction execution and error detection in the SSD 
pipeline 92 
Figure 6.5 The RETs of the large-scale SSD system: (a) Effect of scaling V-
pipeline. (b) RET for each benchmark (V-pipeline: 8-8/8/8-128:32-
5/2/4/1 of 61.7% area) 96 
Figure 6.6 The RETs of the mid-scale SSD system: (a) Scaling V-pipeline. (b) 
RET for each benchmark (V-pipeline: 8-4/4/4-64:16-3/1/2/1 of 61.9% 
area. Note this case is not shown in (a)) 96 
Figure 6.7 The RETs of the small-scale SSD system: (a) Scaling V-pipeline. (b) 
RET for each benchmark (V-pipeline: 8-2/4/4-32:8-2/1/2/1 of 69.7% 
area) 97 
X 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1 (a) The FILs of the IU and I-cache 14 
Table 2.1 (b) The FILs of the D-cache and the remaining units 15 
Table 3.1 Base cache parameters 47 
Table 3.2 Summary of benchmarks 48 
Table 3.3 EPR (%) vs. the number of parity entries 51 
Table 4.1 Hit ratios (%) of 16 KB on-chip I-cache and. D-cache 59 
Table 4.2 Characteristics of benchmark programs 65 
Table 4.3 Write rate on LI cache 66 
Table 4.4 Effect of bus management scheme 71 
Table 4.5 Verification abortion rate (%) on preemptive bus handling 72 
Table 5.1 The complete list of FILs in SimR2K: logic blocks are grouped by type 
and protection scheme 82 
Table 5.2 Outcome classification of fault inject run 83 
Table 6.1 The baseline and SSD processor configuration 94 
Table 6.2 Benchmarks and input files 94 
Table 6.3 Die area breakdown 95 
xi 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I express my deep gratitude to my advisor, Professor Arun K. Somani, for his tremendous 
guidance, support, and encouragement throughout my graduate study at Iowa State and Wash­
ington. His professional advice and insights always led me to the right directions in research 
and career. He has always been my role model. 
I would like to sincerely thank Prof. Shin-dug Kim for introducing me to the most fasci­
nating world of computer engineering. I wish to thank Prof. Oliver Diessel, Prof. Soohwan 
Jung, and Dr. Donglok Kim for his encouragement and invaluable advice. I also thank my 
colleagues at the Dependable Computing and Networking Laboratory (DCNL) for construc­
tive discussions and companionship through the years: Ling Li, Stefano Chessa, Govindarajan 
Krishnamurthy, Sashisekaran Thiagarajan, Murari Sridharan, Srinivasan Ramasubramanian, 
Liang Zhao, Joel Nickel, Rama Sangireddy, Anirban Chakrabarti, Aaron Striegel, Jing Fang, 
Huesung Kim, and Wu Tao. Special thanks to Matt Virgo, Jason Thomas, Aaron Cordes, Jon 
E. Froehlich, and Mei-Peng Cheong for being our undergraduate research assistants, working 
with me on the research projects, and sharing their enthusiasm for active learning. 
Finally, I am very grateful to Siwon, my wife, for her love and constant support. I cannot 
thank her enough for successfully managing our Ames life without family, old friends, and 
joyful life in Seoul. I also thank my mother for being such a super-mom, and Younghee Noh, 
Kwangyeon Shin, Nanyoung, and Youngeun for their love and support from Seoul. 
xii 
ABSTRACT 
As high computing power is available at an affordable cost, we rely on microprocessor-based 
systems for much greater variety of applications. This dependence indicates that a processor 
failure could have more diverse impacts on our daily lives. Therefore, dependability is becoming 
an increasingly important quality measure of microprocessors. 
Temporary hardware malfunctions caused by unstable environmental conditions can lead 
the processor to an incorrect state. This is referred to as a transient error or soft error. 
Studies have shown that soft errors are the major source of system failures. This dissertation 
characterizes the soft error behavior on microprocessors and presents new microarchitectural 
approaches that can realize high dependability with low overhead. 
Our fault injection studies using RISC processors have demonstrated that different func­
tional blocks of the processor have distinct susceptibilities to soft errors. The error suscep­
tibility information must be reflected in devising fault tolerance schemes for cost-sensitive 
applications. Considering the common use of on-chip caches in modern processors, we inves­
tigated area-efficient protection schemes for memory arrays. The idea of caching redundant 
information was exploited to optimize resource utilization for increased dependability. We also 
developed a mechanism to verify the integrity of data transfer from lower level memories to 
the primary caches. The results of this study show that by exploiting bus idle cycles and 
the information redundancy, an almost complete check for the initial memory data transfer is 
possible without incurring a performance penalty. 
For protecting the processor's control logic, which usually remains unprotected, we propose 
a low-cost reliability enhancement strategy. We classified control logic signals into static and 
dynamic control depending on their changeability, and applied various techniques including 
commit-time checking, signature caching, component-level duplication, and control flow moni­
toring. Our schemes can achieve more than 99% coverage with a very small hardware addition. 
Finally, a virtual duplex architecture for superscalar processors is presented. In this system-
level approach, the processor pipeline is backed up by a partially replicated pipeline. The 
replication-based checker minimizes the design and verification overheads. For a large-scale 
superscalar processor, the proposed architecture can bring 61.4% reduction in die area while 
sustaining the maximum performance. 
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Microprocessors are used in a wide variety of applications from small calculators to multi-
million dollar servers. As we become more dependent upon microprocessor-based systems, 
increasing attention is paid not only to the processor's computing speed but also to its de­
pendability. Dependability is the trait of being dependable including reliability, availability, 
serviceability, safety, security, trustability, and many other capabilities that the users expect 
from the system. Among those, reliability and availability are most frequently used dependabil­
ity measures. Reliability is defined as the probability of continuous operation over an interval 
[0,T], whereas availability is the proportion of time the system is available to perform useful 
work. 
Modern electronic circuits are extremely complex and, as such, are susceptible to errors 
and failures. Even if a microprocessor is shipped with no design errors or manufacturing 
defects, unstable environmental conditions can generate temporary hardware failures. These 
failures, called transient faults, can cause the processor to malfunction during operation time. 
Traditionally, permanent hardware failures have been greater concern of the processor designers 
and users, but several studies have revealed that the vast majority of detected errors originate 
from the transient faults [1], [2], [3]. The important sources of the transient faults are electro­
magnetic interference, power jitter, and decay of radioactive atoms such as alpha particles and 
extraterrestrial cosmic rays constantly bombarding the earth [4], [5]. Although the transient 
faults are becoming a primary cause of system failure, they are not perceived as often as they 
affect the system by end users. This is because the users generally observe erroneous behavior 
of the system only through the software interface. For example, we simply blame the operating 
system for process hanging on our PCs. However, transient hardware faults can also be the 
source of the failure. The publications on the actual transient failure rates in commercial 
microprocessors are seldom found. The manufacturers usually consider them as proprietary 
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knowledge. 
Although no comprehensive database exists for the dependability investigation of commer­
cial products, we can easily infer serious soft error problems from physical nature of microelec­
tronic circuits. Advances in VLSI technology have shrunk circuit dimensions and improved the 
processor performance dramatically, yet these advances are offset by an increased vulnerability 
to soft errors [6], [7]. This is more apparent from a basic relation of Qcrit = C x V, where 
critical charge Qcrit of a digital circuit element is the minimum charge needed to change the 
element's logic state; since both capacitance (C) and voltage (V) reduce with future tech­
nologies, Qcrit also decreases, and thus, the probability that random noises disrupt the circuit 
significantly increases. In addition, increasing design complexity, doubling transistor density, 
low energy per signal transition, and extremely fast clock cycles magnify the processor's soft 
error sensitivity. Figure 1.1 illustrates that each new technology scaling almost doubles soft 
error rate in an SRAM. A similar increase is expected for the processors. 
1 
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Figure 1.1 FIT (failures in 109 hours) increase of a SRAM cache in scaling 
IC process technology generation. 
An incorrect state of a processor component manifesting transient faults is referred to as a 
soft error. Soft errors in complex microprocessors have various effects. Although every element 
may be susceptible to the soft error, it should be noted that not all errors result in failures. For 
example, a corrupted register value by a transient fault can be overwritten before it is used. 
Errors may be masked without any intended efforts. Nevertheless, the fact that even a single-
bit error may cause fatal damage creates the need of error detection and recovery capabilities. 
Soft errors need to be continuously monitored throughout the chips' lifetime. Keeping the chip 
dependability under control is critical and also challenging to fully appreciate the benefits of 
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deep submicron scaling. Unfortunately, research in the area of the processor dependability has 
been generally limited to a few critical applications. To cope with the increasing reliability 
concern for a broader range of microprocessors, a wide choice of dependability enhancement 
techniques should be developed. 
1.2 Fault Tolerance Techniques 
In order to achieve dependable computing, the first thing is to try to avoid fault occurrence. 
Careful design practices and new fabrication materials with better fault-immunity may lower 
the soft error rate. However, it is not sufficient to prevent the errors from occurring. No 
matter what efforts we make, faults can still occur. External disturbances cannot be completely 
blocked by enhanced shielding and packaging. Therefore, we need to design the processors to be 
tolerant of harmful impacts caused by soft errors. To achieve the desired level of dependability, 
fault tolerance approaches using redundancy must be employed. 
The most common fault tolerance techniques (FTTs) are error-checking codes (ECCs) and 
hardware/time replication. For processor chip protection against soft errors, information in 
storage units such as caches is usually covered by ECCs [3], [8]. The protection codes are easily 
combined with regular structured memory arrays and check data bit errors requiring a small 
redundancy addition. The on-chip caches of many general-purpose processors are currently 
equipped with parity and/or SEC/DED codes [9], [10], [82], [83], [84], [11], [12]. The ECCs 
can also cover buses. ALUs may be protected by residue codes and illegal condition checks [13]. 
Other types of ECCs include m/n code, checksum, arithmetic code, cyclic code, etc. Unlike 
memory protection, integrity checking of random logic is very difficult due to irregularity. 
Traditional coding-based techniques may also be used for random logic at the circuit-level, but 
their applications and coverage are limited. Moreover, they may cause design delay and be 
prohibited due to performance penalties. At the system level, partial or entire computation 
can be repeated through the same or replicated processor modules for comparison [103], [104]. 
This approach can provide 100% error detection without introducing much design complexity. 
The major drawback of the system-level replication is high additional cost, and this usually 
restricts its use to general applications. Even if a sufficient die area can be budgeted for 
multiple processor modules, power dissipation issue can be an obstacle in many applications. 
Signature monitoring is a technique to check the integrity of program execution and the 
flow of control by comparing reference and run-time information [14], [15], [16]. Traditional 
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signature monitoring schemes were developed at the system-level. A watchdog processor con­
currently monitors the processor's behavior using signals on external address and data buses 
[17], [18]. Because of the scheme's inherent limitation in observability, the external signature 
monitoring for complex processors with built-in caches is not effective. The signature moni­
toring can be implemented fully in software [19], [20]. Instead of using a specialized hardware 
monitor, signatures are embedded in the program code and the control flow error is internally 
checked at every assertion point that is assigned by compiler's preprocessing. Since the mon­
itoring consumes the processor's computing power, this approach degrades more than 30% of 
performance. In order to reduce performance impact, the ARC [21] technique exploits the 
processor's unutilized resources for error checking. It achieves high coverage in detecting the 
errors of some defined types, but the original resource usage of the base processor modeled is 
too low (on average 36% for integer unit and 17% for floating-point unit). 
Idle resources can be also used for redundant execution of instructions. In the REdundant 
computation with Shifted Operands (RESO) technique [22], [23], [24], a function is recomputed 
with shifted operands for the verification using idle pipeline slots. Operand shifting makes it 
possible to detect permanent faults as well as transient faults in the computational functional 
unit. However, only computation instructions can be covered with this approach. In [25], 
[26], [27], re-computation approach is applied to superscalar processor models. The technique 
guarantees that every instruction in actual program flow is issued and computed twice by 
retaining decoded instruction in an internal buffer. Like the RESO, its coverage is still limited 
to execution phase of the pipeline. 
Recently, thread-level fault detection schemes have been proposed for the simultaneous 
multithreading (SMT) architecture [31]. AR-SMT [32] and SRT [33] processors run two copies 
of the same program in separate thread contexts by dynamically partitioning resources, and 
then compare the outputs of each redundant instruction pair. While this approach checks the 
integrity of every instruction execution on the SMT processor, the performance penalty may 
be high unless enough idle resources are available. Executing each instruction twice results 
in 10~30% decrease in performance. The re-execution approach was also implemented in 
multiscalar architecture [34]. Despite a lot of processing resources, its performance degrades 
by 5~15%. In REESE approach on a superscalar processor model [35], spare hardware is 
strategically added to eliminate performance impact of re-execution. The study indicates 
that idle resources are often limitedly utilized for redundant execution, thus requiring a large 
addition of spare hardware. 
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Augmenting the commit phase of the processor pipeline with a checker was proposed for 
functional verification in microprocessor designs in [28], [29], [30], where a separately designed 
checker continuously monitors the processor's operations. Commit-time checking and logic 
optimization can provide area reduction for the checker processor. This approach however 
uses a heterogeneous checker that may require large design and verification overhead. Besides, 
the checker is unrealistically assumed to be fault free. Synchronization and implementation 
feasibility issues need more investigation in these proposals. In case of design errors, one can 
expect performance that of checker processor only. 
For integration into modern microprocessors, FTTs need to achieve the goals of negligible 
performance impact, low cost, and high coverage. Although several processor integrity checking 
techniques have been proposed, achieving these goals at the same time is still an open question. 
1.3 Our Research Goals 
We have reviewed common techniques and identified issues and problems with them. Each 
FTT, in particular processor integrity monitoring (PIM) scheme, differs in the level and format 
of redundancy employed. The redundancy level represents the amount of extra operation time, 
hardware, and software devoted to integrity checking. The redundancy format indicates the 
degree of difference from original operation. The redundancy domain formed by these two 
factors. The coverage of a PIM usually improves as more redundancy is used. Each new 
redundancy format incurs complexity and increases time to design, implement, and verify. 
The general objective of this dissertation is to find proper design point in redundancy domain 
that achieves optimal coverage and complexity characteristics, while keeping the redundancy 
to a minimal level. Two key issues are 1) how to minimize various overheads of the redundant 
operation, and 2) how to maximize the protection coverage. 
In order to realize our research goals, we have conducted an extensive study on the mi­
croprocessor dependability enhancement. The rest of the dissertation analyzes problems and 
presents our solutions as follows. Chapter 2 reports our fault injection experiments on the 
picoJava-II™ processor, a commercial microprocessor from Sun Microsystems. Prior to any 
development of the FTT, it is fundamental to understand how much the processor is sensitive 
to transient faults. This provides us a guideline of strategic use of redundancy for enhanc­
ing dependability. Chapter 3 presents area efficient techniques for memory array protection. 
We also demonstrate our flexible design choices. Considering the fact that more than 50% of 
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modern processor chip area is devoted to on-chip cache memories, our techniques can make 
a significant contribution. Chapter 4 addresses the importance of initial data transfer from a 
lower memory to primary caches in multi-level caching system. Our technique assures correct 
data transfer utilizing idle bus cycles and existing information redundancy. Chapter 5 discusses 
challenges in protecting random logic. On-line monitoring technique using a signature cache 
is examined. Chapter 6 presents a system-level approach for superscalar processors. We prove 
that a duplex system can be realized with much lower overheads than the conventional duplex 
system. In Chapter 8 we makes some concluding remarks. 
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CHAPTER 2 Soft Error Susceptibility of the picoJava-II processor 
Dependability is becoming an increasingly important quality measure of microprocessors 
in a wide range of applications. This chapter investigates the soft error sensitivity (SES) 
of the picoJava-II processor through software simulated fault injections in its RTL model. 
Soft errors are generated under a realistic fault model during program run-time. The SES 
of a processor logic block is defined as the probability that a soft error in the block causes 
the processor to behave erroneously or have an incorrect architectural state. The SES is 
measured at the functional block level. We have found that highly error-sensitive blocks 
are common for various workloads, while soft errors in many logic blocks rarely affect the 
computation integrity. Our results show that a reasonable prediction of the SES is possible by 
deduction from the processor's microarchitecture. We also demonstrate that the sensitivity-
based integrity checking strategy can be an efficient way to improve fault coverage per unit 
redundancy. 
2.1 Processor Fault Behavior 
Understanding the processor's behavior in the presence of soft errors has a fundamental 
value in devising fault tolerant techniques, and fault injection methodologies can be used for 
that purpose [36], [37]. Faults are intentionally created in the processor with special software 
and/or hardware tools and the operations are monitored for erroneous effects. Ideally, the 
criteria of determining the protection requirement for a processor should include soft error 
rate and actual failure observation analysis, but mostly they are approximated. Even though 
reasonably accurate information is obtained by processor manufacturers, it is generally not 
revealed for long time. Soft error studies on commercial products have been rare in academia 
because of limited access to detailed processor models and/or experiment equipment. There­
fore, it is not easy to have comprehensive knowledge of soft error characteristics for various 
microprocessors. 
The fault injection is more often used to evaluate the effectiveness of the fault tolerance 
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mechanisms. A properly designed mechanism is expected to detect injected errors quickly and 
bring the processor state back to normal. While different options for the mechanism are tested 
to measure fault coverage, corresponding overheads also need to be examined. It is important 
that the error checking and recovery process does not degrade the processor's performance. 
The fault injection experiments facilitate all of these investigations. 
This chapter presents a case study of soft error characterization using picoJava™-II, which 
is a microprocessor core developed by Sun Microsystems. The register transfer level (RTL) 
model of the picoJava-II became publicly available in 1999 to enable different groups of re­
searchers to study, extend, and improve this commercial product. Our major effort here is to 
gain a good insight into the picoJava-II core's behavior under faulty environment. We em­
ploy a software simulated fault injection method and observe how much the core is susceptible 
to transient faults while processing programs. We also identify and characterize dominant 
factors that affect the processor's sensitivity to the faults. If this kind of investigation is 
combined with sufficient understanding of the processor architecture, the designers can sig­
nificantly reduce overhead for integrity checking and maximize protection capability. This 
chapter substantiates such a synergetic case and provides a guideline of low-cost dependability 
enhancement. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section summarizes our 
literature survey on fault injection studies with emphasis on microprocessor behavior and 
identifies the position of our work. Section 2.3 provides a short introduction to the picoJava-II 
architecture. Experimental setups and challenges of the simulations are discussed in Section 
2.4. The results are examined and important findings are addressed in Section 2.5. Section 
2.6 provides a summary. 
2.2 Soft Error Characterization through Fault Injection Methods 
Transient faults can be injected into a microprocessor in many ways, and each method 
has different controllability of fault time and location, level of perturbation to the processor, 
and simulation time and cost requirement. Commonly used hardware methods are pin-level 
injection [38], [39], heavy-ion radiation [1], [40], and electro-magnetic disturbances [41], [42]. 
Recently, non-destructive laser has been also introduced [43], [44]. All of these methods closely 
imitate real fault situations, but they are usually expensive and applicable only after the 
physical chip is available. On the other hand, software fault injection is low-cost and can 
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be applied to programs and operating systems as well [46], [47]. This software method is 
classified into two kinds. The first class is software-implemented method, where the processor 
state or programs are modified during compile or run time and the injection takes place on 
real hardware. The other class is simulation-based method, where the processor, workload, 
and fault injections are all modeled in software simulation. In general, the latter is more 
flexible than the former as it provides better controllability of fault injection and observability 
of system behavior. In this chapter, we use a simulation-based approach. 
Several tools have been developed to automate fault injection experiments and some tools 
are even able to analyze the observations they make. Extensive discussion on those is given in 
[36] and [37]. GOOFI in [49] is an object-oriented injection tool that is designed to be portable 
to different platforms. The efficiency of diverse fault injection tools are compared in [48]. An 
advanced tool reduces simulation time by conducting more than one injection simultaneously, 
and also supports event handling mechanisms and multiple system/fault models. Since fault 
simulation space is so large, it is always very challenging to obtain accurate behavior analysis in 
an acceptable time frame. Thus, a proper fault injection tool and technique should be selected 
for each target processor after careful examination. In our study, we adapt existing techniques, 
but modify them to be suitable for the picoJava-II core and our experimental environment. 
This will be explained in detail in Section 2.4. 
Emulated fault models affect the fault manifestation. The most popular way to model 
the transient fault is logic inversion, where each fault flips the logic values temporarily. A 
study in [50] indicates that error behavior modeling is dependent on workload and hence 
various workloads need to be considered. However, there may also be common characteristics 
over different workloads that we can take advantage of in fault tolerant design. For example, 
SimR2K, a 32-bit RISC tested in [51], exhibited a very similar sensitivity pattern when faults 
were injected for several workloads. 
More importantly, the effects of transient faults strongly vary with processor architecture 
and possibly fault injection methodology. In [52], a jet engine controller called HS1602 was 
upset by current and voltage transients. The results show that faults in the arithmetic unit 
are most likely to propagate and result in logic failure. In another experiment, RTL model 
of the IBM RT PC was injected with single-cycle inverted transient faults in [53]. About 
60~70% of injected faults were overwritten. The study also reports that the attributes of 
the workload such as instruction types and control flow structures are good indicators of error 
behavior. Nevertheless, this claim has not been fully verified, and hardware organization might 
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have more direct impacts. Another software modeled 32-bit RISC, called TRIP, was tested 
using VHDL in [54]. The fault injection was performed by toggling the value of randomly 
chosen internal state element bits. While 34% of faults were overwritten at run-time, only 23% 
of faults were effective, i.e., the faults resulted in processor failure. It should be noted that 
processors are capable of masking out some faults without any intended protection mechanism. 
Other systems or processors investigated for error behavior include MC6809E with heavy-
ion radiation and power supply disturbance [40], MC68000 with device-level simulation [55], 
SPARC 1 system with physical injection [56], MC88100 with combination of software-implemented 
and simulation-based fault injection [57], MC68302 with VHDL simulation [58], and MARK2 
with simulated stuck-at and open-line faults [59]. All these studies support the fact that each 
processor has a distinct level of sensitivity to soft errors, and therefore, a new design requires 
separate dependability evaluations and may be engineered for lower sensitivity. 
Once soft errors occur in the logic blocks of a processor, their propagation nature is mainly 
defined by the architecture and workload of the processor. On the other hand, how often 
the soft error appears, transient upset rate, is affected by the fabrication process and circuit 
technology. More upsets mean higher probabilities of soft error occurrence. In [60], the same 
heavy ion was individually radiated into three units of a ERC32 processor, but upset rates 
were different because the units employed diverse circuit types. Errors were observed mostly 
in the register file and some in the combinational logic. Circuits of the integer unit were 
more susceptible to the ions than those of floating point and memory control units. Another 
radiation testing on 486DX4 microprocessors [61] shows that different implementations of a 
common processor architecture result in susceptibility variation. When six 486DX4 processors 
from AMD and Intel were bombarded by radiation beams, AMD's chips were more susceptible 
than Intel's. In the experiment, the feature size of AMD's was smaller than Intel's. 
This dissertation focuses on what impacts soft errors make on the computation of the 
picoJava-II core rather than how often faults generate the soft errors in the processor. Thus, 
our study is independent of implementation and process technology. It can be a base for the 
development of architectural solutions. 
2.3 PicoJava-II Core Architecture 
The picoJava-II is a microprocessor core uniquely designed for directly executing Java byte-
code instructions defined by the Java™ Virtual Machine (JVM) [62] in hardware, and it is used 
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for cost-sensitive embedded applications [63]. This low-cost hardware implementation of JVM 
offers high performance without the need for just-in-time compilers. The core is equipped 
with a six-stage RISC pipeline and instruction folding capability (a process of loading and 
executing an instruction in a single cycle). With proper compilation, the core can also process 
programs written in legacy C/C++ language comparable in speed to other RISC processors. 
Chips based on the picoJava-II are well suited for a wide range of information appliances such 
as digital set-top boxes, Internet TVs, cellular phones, personal digital assistants, automotive 
communication devices, etc. As the use of such products increases, their malfunctions due 
to transient faults may cause serious loss of time, money, or even worse. Dependability will 
become a more important quality measure for the products. Therefore, sufficient estimation 
and enhancement of dependability are imperative. 
The picoJava-II core we use in our study is a soft intellectual property (IP) as opposed 
to hard IP under the sun community source licensing program [64]. The soft IP described 
in Verilog, a popular hardware description language for logic design, specifies the detailed 
implementation of the picoJava-II core and completely simulates the real chip. To make the 
chip more suitable for a particular application, some features of the core can be reconfigured. 
However, we consider a core with the standard features in the original IP. 
A full description of the picoJava-II core architecture is presented in [65]. Figure 2.1 
illustrates our floor plan for an implementation of the picoJava-II. The area ratios between 
functional unit blocks (FUBs) are approximated by using picoJava-II synthesis results from 
[66]. When the area is measured in terms of 2-input NAND equivalent gates, more than 69% 
of the chip is devoted to cache memory arrays and control logic. To assist the core behavior 
analysis, we briefly discuss the functionalities of its major FUBs: (1) integer unit (IU); (2) 
instruction cache unit (ICU); (3) instruction cache tag (ITAG); (4) instruction cache RAM 
(ICRAM); (5) data cache unit (DCU); (6) data cache tag (DTAG); (7) data cache RAM 
(DCRAM); (8) floating point unit (FPU); (9) stack manager unit (SMU); (10) power-down, 
clock, and scan unit (PCSU); (11) bus interface unit (BIU); and external memory controller 
(MEMC). 
The IU decodes and executes instructions from an instruction buffer (I-buffer). It forwards 
floating point instructions to the FPU and communicates with the DCU for data. The IU con­
sists of a 32-bit ALU and shifter, a multiply/divide unit, a microcode ROM implementing multi­
cycle instructions, registers, a 64-entry stack cache (SC), and trap generation/dependency 
checking/forwarding logic. The ICU controls a 16-KB direct-mapped instruction cache (I-
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Figure 2.1 Block diagram of the picoJava-II. 
cache) and the I-buffer. It fetches and dispatches instructions to the decode unit of the IU. 
The ITAG contains 1024 19-bit tags. Each tag corresponds to its associated line of 4 words in 
an ICRAM. The ICRAM holds instructions in a RAM of 2048 entries by 64 bits. The DCU 
handles souring and sinking of data from/to a data cache (D-cache) for load and store instruc­
tions. The D-cache consists of a 1024 x 24-bit DTAG and a 4096 x 32-bit DCRAM. configured 
for 16-KB with 16-byte line, 2-way set associative, write-back, and write-allocate. The FPU 
executes the floating point instructions. The SMU handles overflow and underflow conditions 
of the SC. The PCSU integrates power management, clock generation, system reset, scan, and 
test. The BIU is the interface between the core and external world via the MEMC. The MEMC 
is the interface between the BIU and external devices such as memory and I/O. 
2.4 Experimental Setup 
We conducted a set of transient fault injection simulations on the RTL model of the 
picoJava-II processor. This model has been synthesized, validated, and optimized by sev­
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eral commercial vendors and universities. Based on a fault model we defined, the faults were 
simulated entirely in software while each application program was running. Our fault model 
basically follows the conventional signal inversion approach, but it is not restricted to single-bit 
failure. The probability of a fault occurrence is uniformly distributed over operation time and 
logic location. A fault in a logic block is manifested as a logic value toggle of its output signals, 
from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0. Multiple signal bits can be corrupted by a single fault. 
Fault injection locations (FELs) in the processor are determined on a minimal logic block 
basis. Each FUB shown in Figure 2.1 is divided into sub-blocks after examining error propaga­
tion paths with test generation rules. If logic gates in a FUB have common fault effects on an 
output signal of the FUB, i.e., fault equivalent gates, they are grouped together and treated 
as a single FIL. Consequently, a FIL is a sub-block responsible for producing an output signal 
of a FUB, and a fault in the FIL means a soft error in the corresponding output signal. 
A fault occurs 
Erroneous 
output 
<=4 
Fault simulation 
via interface 
Fault injection Interface 
Fault mask 
generation 
Fault simulation control 
Simulated 
Output 
Figure 2.2 Transparent software interface for fault injection. 
The fault injections are carried out through software interfaces appended to the processor. 
Figure 2.2 depicts the block diagram of our fault injection interface integrated with a FIL. An 
interface is placed at each output port of the FUB, and it takes the output signal and produces 
a simulated output signal under the fault simulation control. The simulation control is another 
software module that allows us to direct the fault type and injection timing and duration. The 
fault mask specifies bit positions for the signal inversion. The total number of error bits per 
injection is chosen randomly with a minimum value of 1. Although the injection interfaces are 
embedded in the processor simulator, they are completely transparent to any other component 
and effective only in the case of fault simulation. 
Table 2.1 lists all FILs identified for the picoJava-II FUBs and describes their output 
FIL 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
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Table 2.1 (a) The FILs of the IU and I-cache. 
Output signal 
Name/Width Description Destination FUB(s) 
u_addr_e 
u_br_pc 
u_brtaken_e 
u_icu_flush_e 
u_psr 
u_shift_d 
u_data_e 
u_kill_dcu 
kill_inst_e 
u_special_e 
u_dcu_flush_e 
u_inst_e 
u_zero_e 
u_data_in 
u_sbase_we 
u_optop_din 
u_optop_int_we 
ret__optop_update 
u_smu_flush 
u_rf_dout 
u_smiss 
u_smiss_addr 
u_smiss_data 
u_powerdown_op_e 
u_rs1_e 
u_rs2_e 
fpop 
fpop_valid 
iu_kill_fpu 
hold
-
fgu_____^_ 
32 
32 
1 
1 
32 
8 
32 
1 
1 
1 
3 
8 
1 
32 
1 
32 
1 
1 
1 
32 
1 
32 
32 
1 
32 
32 
8 
1 
1 
1 
Address to the l-cache & D-cache 
Branch or trap target PC 
Branch instruction is taken 
Rush the l-cache 
Processor status register 
The number of data bytes shifted from the IFU 
Bypassed IU data to the l-cache and D-cache 
Terminate outstanding DCU operations 
Kill DCU instruction 
Special instruction 
Flush instructions 
Load and store instruction 
A zero line instruction 
Stack base-address 
Write enable for iu_data_in 
Value of top of stack pointer register (OPTOP) 
Write enable for iu_optop_din 
Return instruction updating OPTOP 
Kill all loads and stores 
Spill data from the IU 
SC write miss 
The address for the SC write miss 
The data for the SC write miss 
The IU executes powerdown instruction 
The first operand for FPU 
The second operand for FPU 
Java floating point opcode 
Valid fpop input 
Terminate the fpop 
_FreezeanFPUoperation__^_^_______ 
ICU. DCU 
ICU 
ICU 
ICU 
ICU, DCU. SMU 
ICU 
ICU. DCU 
DCU 
DCU 
DCU 
DCU 
DCU 
DCU 
SMU 
SMU 
SMU 
SMU 
SMU 
SMU 
SMU 
SMU 
SMU 
SMU 
PCSU 
FPU 
FPU 
FPU 
FPU 
FPU 
FPU 
icu_data 
icu_drty 
icu_vld_d 
icu_length_d 
icu_pc_d 
icu_hold 
icu_din 
icu_ram_we 
icram_powerdown 
icu_addr 
icu_tag_in 
icu_tag_vld 
icu_tag_we 
icu_in_powerdown 
pjjcureq 
pj_icusize 
pijcutype 
pj icuaddr 
56 
7 
7 
28 
32 
1 
32 
2 
1 
14 
18 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
32 
Top 7 bytes of the l-buffer 
Dirty bits of the 7 entrees in the l-buffer 
Valid bits of the 7 entrees in the l-buffer 
Lengths of instructions in the l-buffer 
PC of the first instruction of the l-buffer 
The ICU is unable to service request 
Data to be written to the ICRAM 
Write enable to ICRAM 
Power-down the ICRAM and ITAG 
l-cache address used 
Data to be written to the ITAG 
Valid bit value for the ITAG 
Write enable to the ITAG 
The ICU is ready for standby mode 
Request instructions from the BIU 
The size of the l-cache transaction 
The type of the l-cache transaction 
Physical address for the instruction request 
IU 
IU 
IU 
IU 
IU 
IU 
ICRAM 
ICRAM 
ICRAM, ITAG 
ICRAM, ITAG 
ITAG 
ITAG 
ITAG 
PCSU 
BIU 
BIU 
BIU 
BIU 
itag_dout 
itag_vld 
ic hit 
Tag data from the ITAG 
Valid bit from the ITAG 
l-cache hit 
ICU 
ICU 
ICU 
icramdout 64 Data from ICRAM ICU 
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Table 2.1 (b) The FILs of the D-cache and the remaining units. 
FUB FIL Output signal Destination FUB(s) Name /Width uviwiipuon 
53 iu_data_vld 1 Data on dcujdata is valid IU data IU 
54 dcu_data 32 Data from the D-Cache IU. SMU 
55 iu_stall 1 Stall the IU pipeline IU 
56 dcu_err_ack 3 Error acks due to data access exception IU 
57 dcujn_powerdown 2 The DCU is ready for standby mode PCSU 
58 dcu_din_e 32 Data to be written to the DCRAM DCRAM 
59 dcu_ram_we 4 Write enable to the D-cache DCARM 
60 dcu_pwrdown 1 Power-down the DCRAM and DTAG DCRAM.DTAG 
61 dcu_stat_addr 13 Address for writes to status register and DCRAM DCRAM,DTAG 
62 dcu_bank_sel 2 Select bank of the DCRAM DCRAM 
63 dcu_bypass 1 Bypass the DCRAM DCRAM 
64 dcu_tag_in 19 Data to be written to the DTAG DTAG 
DCU 65 dcu_stat_out 5 Data to be written to status reg. of the DTAG DTAG 66 dcu_set_sel 1 Select set of the DTAG DTAG 
67 wb_set_sel 1 Write buffer set select DTAG 
68 dcu_tag_we 1 Write enable for the DTAG DTAG 
69 dcu_stat_we 5 Write enable for status reg. of the DTAG DTAG 
70 dcu_addr_out 32 Address of data to be accessed in the D-cache DTAG 
71 smu_stall 1 Stall the SMU pipe due to a cache miss SMU 
72 smu_data_vld 1 Data on dcu_data is valid SMU data SMU 
73 dcu_smu_st 1 The SMU stores in the cache-stage SMU 
74 pj_dcureq 1 Request data from the BIU BIU 
75 pj_dcusize 2 The size of the D-cache transaction BIU 
76 pLdcutype 3 The type of the D-cache transaction BIU 
77 pi_dcuaddr 32 Physical address for the data request BIU 
78 pi dataout 32 Data to be written to the external device BIU 
79 tag_dout 19 Tag data of the selected set DCU 
DTAG 80 dtg_stat_out 5 Status bits of DTAG DCU 81 hitO 1 D-cache hit in set 0 DCU 
82 hit1 1 D-cache hit in set 1 DCU 
DCRAM 83 dcram dout 64 Data from the DCRAM DCU 
FPU 84 fp_rdy_e 1 The FPU is ready to accept new request IU 85 fpu data e 32 The result of the FPU operation IU 
86 smu rf din 32 Fill data to the SC IU 
87 smu_rf_addr 6 The SC for reads and writes IU 
88 smu_we 1 Write enable to the SC IU 
89 smu_sbase 30 Updated base stack-address IU 
90 smu_sbase_we 1 Write enable for smu_sbase IU 
SMU 91 smu_hold 1 Hold the IU pipeline IU.DCU 
92 smu_addr 32 Address for spills/fills & memory protection check IU.DCU 
93 smu_st 1 A D-cache store request during spills IU.DCU 
94 smujd 1 A D-cache load request during fills IU.DCU 
95 smu_data 32 Data for the D-cache writes DCU 
96 smu_na st 1 A nonallocate store DCU 
PCSU 
97 
98 
99 
pj_nmi_sync 
PjJrLsync 
pcsu _powerdown 
1 
4 
1 
Synchronized nonmaskable interrupt 
Synchronized interrupt request line 
Power-down (standby mode) request 
IU 
IU 
ICU. DCU. FPU 
100 
101 
102 
pj_dcuack 
pjjcuack 
pj_datain 
2 
2 
32 
Bus acknowledgment for an D-cache transfer 
Bus acknowledgment for an l-cache transfer 
Data from an external device 
DCU 
ICU 
ICU. DCU 
BIU 103 pj_data_out 32 Data written to an external device MEMC 104 pj_address 30 Address of a data access to an external device MEMC 
105 PLsize 2 The size of a data transfer MEMC 
106 PLtype 4 The type of a data transfer MEMC 
107 Pi-tv 1 The indication of a valid cycle on the bus MEMC 
MEMC 108 109 
pj_data_in 
PLack 
32 
2 
Data read from an external device 
The bus acknowledgment for a transaction 
BIU 
BIU 
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signals with destined FUBs. One can further break down each FIL into smaller sub-FILs 
at a lower level of the RTL model hierarchy, but it does not provide significant advantages 
in understanding fault behavior despite the need of a large increase in evaluation time. For 
example, 32 bit slices for an address adder in FIL 1 can be separately examined, but additional 
knowledge we expect to gain from that is small. Each FIL can include both random logic and 
memory arrays, or only one of them. When the fault is injected into the FIL, its function 
determines the type of soft error being generated such as a control error, data error, etc. 
Four application programs implementing different algorithms were used for benchmarking 
workloads as follows. Bubble implements an elementary bubble sort method for sorting 64 inte­
ger numbers. The algorithm involves comparing and exchanging elements to properly position 
in a data structure. Crypt performs encryption and decryption using IDEA (International 
Data Encryption Algorithm) on an array of N bytes. This Java kernel program is a part of the 
Java Grande Forum Benchmark Suite [67]. N was 800 in our study. We also used an optimized 
Java version of the well known Unpack benchmark. Linpack solves an N x N linear system 
using LU factorization followed by a triangular solve. It measures floating point performance 
with a numerically intensive test. Our problem size was 25 x 25. Queens finds all the solu­
tions of the Eight Queens problem on an 8x8 board using a recursive algorithm. We believe 
these programs carry out frequently used operations in the applications of the picoJava-II. 
All benchmarks were tested on both the picoJava-II processor and other JVM platforms for a 
cross-check. 
If a fault is injected at a certain time of program execution, its effects may appear immedi­
ately or many cycles later. Thus, observation through the end of execution may be necessary 
in order to check all possible scenarios of that particular fault. This approach however is not 
suitable for testing many faults because each fault injection takes a full program execution 
time, which can be a few days in the RTL simulation. To obtain statistically significant re­
sults, a large number of fault cases should be considered. Thus, minimizing simulation time 
per injection is necessary. 
With more simulation control and a slightly lowered level of observation detail, several faults 
can be examined during a single execution. Figure 2.3 illustrates how we performed the fault 
injection and made observation in a targeted FIL on the picoJava-II. At the beginning of each 
simulation run, the RTL simulator invokes another processor simulator, called the Instruction 
Accurate Simulator (IAS), which models all functionality of the picoJava-II by instruction 
boundaries. The architectural states of both simulators are identical after the commitment of 
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Figure 2.3 Fault injection and observation timing diagram. 
every instruction under the fault free condition. The primary purpose of the IAS is to serve as 
a golden run for monitoring the RTL simulation when the fault is active. Fault injection points 
(FIPs) at which faults are injected into the processor are considered after the initialization and 
warm-up period. The FIP i is randomly picked from a window of 50 clock cycles starting from 
the first basepoint (BPi). At the FIPi, the RTL simulation is checkpointed, i.e., saving the 
current state of the simulated processor, during the first half of the clock period. When the 
clock goes to low, the fault injection begins and lasts for a predefined interval, denoted by 
fault injection duration (FID). A single clock cycle may be enough for the injected fault to be 
latched as a soft error. The longer the fault is resident in the FIL, the more likely it is to affect 
the processor. Given this behavior we chose 1 and 10 clock cycles for short and long FIDs, 
respectively. 
After the fault injection at FIPi, the simulation is monitored up to the next base point 
(BP%), and then the architectural state of the RTL simulator is compared with the state of 
the IAS simulator. If the fault has been effective, the states mismatch. In this case, the RTL 
simulator rolls back to FIPi using the checkpointed state and the IAS is paused until the RTL 
reaches BPg with no fault injection. Otherwise both simulators proceed to FlPg The same 
procedure is repeated for subsequent fault injections. The more FIPs tested for a FIL, the 
higher accuracy in estimation. We chose 100 FIPs during a benchmark run for a single FIL. 
In our simulation, every single fault injection created a soft error in the FIL. The effects 
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of different occurrence timings of soft errors were examined. We define soft error sensitivity 
(SES) of a FEL as the probability that a soft error in the FIL causes the processor to behave 
erroneously or have an incorrect architectural state. The outcome of each fault injection 
at a FIP is classified into four cases: 1) no harmful impacts are made to the processor; 2) 
the program running on the processor hangs; 3) the system crashes before the simulation 
reaches the next base point for the state comparison; or 4) the simulation continues to the 
base point, but the architectural state is corrupted. Thus, the SES of a FIL is computed by 
<p4 Case i 
nvmter of faults' measured the sensitivities of all 109 FILs in the picoJava-II. 
It is important to use a sufficiently large base interval so that the soft error has enough time 
to manifest as a noticeable failure. We set the base interval to 600 clock cycles. It should be 
noted that the soft error may not generate any failure or may be overwritten. Other metrics 
such as error latency and propagation pattern are helpful in fault characteristics analysis. 
However, we focused only on the SES collection and analysis since, given our limited resources, 
it still enables us to obtain a reasonable level of understanding of the picoJava-II. 
2.5 Soft Error Sensitivity of the PicoJava-II 
In this section, we present and analyze the SES results for four workloads. The results 
illustrated together are based on the common simulation parameters unless otherwise specified. 
The error of our SES estimate is less than 0.098 for a 95% confidence level. The architectural 
significance of FILs are reviewed and their relations with the SES are considered. We also point 
out what we can benefit from the SES information in devising an integrity checking scheme for 
the picoJava-II, and evaluate how well the techniques used in current microprocessors reflect 
the soft error behavior. 
2.5.1 Integer unit 
Figure 2.4 depicts the distribution of effective faults in FILs of the IU. The FID is 1 clock 
cycle. The most apparent characteristic in this figure is that only a few FILs are highly 
sensitive to the faults. There are many FILs whose corrupted output signals do not stimulate 
any erroneous behavior of the processor. We can also note that sensitive FILs are mostly 
common for different programs and the types of the impacts are similar. Clearly, a faulty 
signal is effective only if it plays an active role in the processor's operation. If the signal is not 
stored, the window when the processor is vulnerable to the fault is only 1 clock period. Even 
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though the signal can propagate to other components, there is still a chance that the error is 
overwritten before it creates any problem. The results indicate that many sub-blocks in the 
IU infrequently become a critical part of the operation. 
Less than 10 sub-blocks overall are considerably susceptible. FIL 1 produces the address 
of the I-cache and D-cache. An incorrect address here means a memory access to a wrong 
location. On a write, the memory state may become faulty. On a read, unexpected data or 
instructions may be delivered to the processor. Consequently, a soft error in this sub-block 
is critical. However, it is only occasionally true because the cache memories are not always 
accessed. The erroneous write may occur at an invalid location and never get used. Although 
it is not very likely, data items or even instructions from multiple locations may be the same. 
Thus, reading from any of these locations is identical. In short, there are many conditions 
that can stop or trigger the malicious actions of the soft error in FIL 1. We have observed 
that the cache address error causes system crashes when it is effective, and the SES of the 
corresponding sub-block is about 0.27, 0.08, 0.06, and 0.12 for Bubble, Crypt, Linpack, and 
Queens respectively. The error margin for 95% confidence level is ±0.09, ±0.05, ±0.05, and 
±0.06, respectively. 
Memory address checking is performed to some extent in conventional processors. The 
operating system can check the address range of each memory access, yet this cannot detect 
an error within an accessible region. The address generator, i.e., an adder, can be protected 
with parity prediction, residue code, or similar kind. Duplication may be too costly for low-end 
systems. The frequency of the cache access depends on the program, and it may increase in 
superscalar processors. In any case, relative importance of this sub-block is high, and thus, it 
is worth covering if possible. 
FIL 3 is a part of branch logic informing the ICU and the pipeline that a branch should 
occur after the instruction in the execution stage. When it is faulty, the control flow of program 
may change. It can affect timing of the pipeline as well. As soon as the execution deviates 
from the correct flow, the processor state becomes erroneous, which can lead the processor to 
crash within the base interval (600 clock cycles). As a result, the SES goes up to 0.86. This 
sub-block is a critical component of the IU. FIL 6 is another critical part as it can affect the 
program counter (PC) and instruction shifting to the I-buffer. Since this sub-block is also 
concerned with the control flow, its erroneous behavior is similar to that of FIL 3. 
Check code-based protection cannot be easily applied to protect random logic in FUBs 
such as FIL 3 and FIL 6. Unlike memory arrays, the relation between input and output 
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Figure 2.4 The SES of the integer unit (IU) when FID = 1. 
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signals dynamically vary. A simple approach is to duplicate the logic. The replication can be 
considered at any level of logic block hierarchy. FUB-level duplication is the simplest, but area 
overhead is large. Critical sub-blocks can be selectively duplicated to lower the overhead. 
An error in FIL 8 or FIL 9 can result in an unexpected termination or continuation of 
the D-cache access instruction and its operation. FIL 12 controls the size, type, cacheability, 
and endianness of the D-cache access. FIL 13 signals the D-cache to fill a particular cache 
line with O's. All these sub-blocks are critical only when the D-cache is in action. Among the 
IU sub-blocks, FIL 15 is the most susceptible to the error. This is because the earliest entry 
of the SC is always corrupted if its output signal is toggled. If this happens, the process is 
very likely to be suspended. It should be noted that the SES of FIL 15 for bubble is 1. This 
is a first-protect portion of the processor. FIL 16 has similar impacts as it is responsible for 
the top of the stack pointer. The picoJava-II supports an additional standby mode for low 
power management. The last critical sub-block FIL 24 may assert a false signal to the PCSU, 
which eventually puts the I-cache and D-cache in standby mode. In this case, the system 
crashes immediately. Converting standby mode to active mode does not degrade computation 
integrity. 
AND 
FIL FIL 
Other 
sub-blocks 
(a) (b) 
Figure 2.5 Possible logical positions of a FIL and their impacts on the 
sensitivity. 
So far we have inspected relatively critical sub-blocks in the IU. Their functions are closely 
connected with essential steps of instruction executions. They are frequently used or placed 
in a logical position such that their malfunctions can often be realized as a failure. Figure 
2.5 illustrates two logical positions that a FIL can be situated with other sub-blocks in the 
processor. The OR and AND are not binary logic gates, but rather conceptual blocks that may 
consist of several processor components. Figure 2.5a is the case where the processor behavior 
is directly governed by the FIL independently of other sub-blocks. It has its own impact on the 
system behavior. On the other hand, Figure 2.5b represents the case where the FIL is effective 
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only with the assistance of other sub-blocks. Unless all the related sub-blocks are active, the 
faulty FIL has no meaning. FIL 15 is an example of the first case. If a FIL falls in the second 
case, its SES depends on the active period of the other related sub-blocks. 
In our experiment, there are many IU FILs that seemed unaffected by the fault injection 
for both FIDs tested (1 and 10). This can be explained by the functionalities of the sub-
blocks as described in Table 2.1. Non-critical sub-blocks are generally involved in infrequently 
occurring operations and their logical positions are mostly the case of Figure 2.5b. For example, 
erroneous FIL 14 appears as a failure only if FIL 15 asserts a write enable signal, which is a 
rare event. Although some FILs can be the case of Figure 2.5a, their errors may not be serious. 
An example is that faulty FIL 4 flushes or invalidates an I-cache line, but this only produces 
an additional memory access. However, not flushing an I-cache line related with self-modifying 
code support or flushing a dirty Une in the D-cache (FIL 11) can alter the processor state. FIL 
30 can stall the FPU for extra cycles, but the processor maintains the computation integrity. 
Similar reasonings can be made for other sub-blocks. 
Although many FILs never exhibit any effective fault in our results, it does not mean that 
they are unnecessary components. It simply shows that randomly selected erroneous periods 
of the FILs did not overlap with their active cycles or their faults have nothing to do with the 
correctness of the computation. When the FID was increased to 10 clocks, more effective faults 
were observed. Figure 2.6 presents the SES results in that case. A FID of 10 is an extreme 
example modeling a strong noise hit that prolongs the circuit's recovery time. FILs 4, 10 and 
28 start to show their susceptibility. Interestingly in FIL 15 for Linpack, the SES is slightly 
lower than the case with the FID of 1. A possible explanation of this is that a faulty signal at 
an earUer cycle corrupted the first entry of the SC, and then a faulty signal at a subsequent 
cycle unintentionally corrected it back to normal. Different FIDs change the type of failure 
in a smaU degree. In order to check if a further increase in the FID makes a difference in 
non-critical sub-blocks, we injected them with 500-clock long faults for Crypt and monitored 
using a 800-clock base interval. Figure 2.7 plots the sensitivities of non-critical sub-blocks in 
all FUBs. Many sub-blocks become somewhat sensitive. 
When considering a protection plan for the IU, our SES results can serve as a standard 
for ranking the sub-blocks in order of importance. We have found that sub-blocks with two 
opposite characteristics, highly susceptible and seldom susceptible to the soft error, do not 
vary with workloads. Moreover, this situation remains for faults with a longer FID. From our 
data, we believe that checking the top few critical sub-blocks alone enhances the integrity of 
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Figure 2.6 The SES of the integer unit when FID = 10. 
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Figure 2.7 The SES check for non-critical sub-blocks by extending the FID 
to 500 clocks. 
the IU significantly. This is a similar concept exploited in cache memory, which contains the 
most frequently used data and covers most of the memory access requests. Depending on the 
logic type of the sub-block, diverse fault handling techniques can be employed. If we take into 
account design and verification complexity, duplication is a fair choice for random logic. We 
claim that the protection plot based on the SES is a very efficient method to maximize the 
fault coverage with limited resources. 
2.5.2 Instruction cache 
Figure 2.8 shows the SES data measured for the I-cache. For each FIL, the two columns 
represent the SES when FID is 1 and 10 clocks, respectively. Critical sub-blocks are fewer than 
the IU. FIL 31 represents instructions stored at the top 7 bytes of the I-buffer. Its error results 
in the execution of incorrect instructions, but the instructions are effective only when their 
valid bits are set. In addition, they are removed on a branch or trap, rendering them inactive. 
Even though this sub-block is a memory array, we first injected the faults for a single clock to 
model transient faults in its random logic portion. If the faults occur in the memory cells, the 
data error stays until overwritten. This situation was moderately tested with a FID of 10. As 
expected, the SES of FIL 31 greatly increases with a longer fault duration. Any consuming 
instructions by the IU are supplied by the I-buffer. Errors in FIL 32 cause instruction state 
transitions. FIL 38 is critical because it allows instructions in the ICRAM to be modified. FIL 
52 is active when its data bytes are transferred to the I-buffer. Any corruption in the I-buffer 
is nullified by a flush. 
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Combining Figures 2.7 and 2.8, distinctively non-critical sub-blocks of the I-cache are FILs 
41, 42, 44, 49, and 50. FILs 41 and 42 are effective only when FIL 43 is active. This models 
the case in Figure 2.5b. If their errors propagate to the ITAG, they are more likely to appear 
as a false I-cache miss, in which the processor fetches instructions from the memory instead. 
The situation is similar for FIL 49 and FIL 50, and therefore, they become hardly sensitive to 
the faults. The PCSU shuts off the clock for standby mode only if both the ICU (FIL 44) and 
DCU (FIL 57) signal that they are ready. A false assertion by FIL 44 alone is automatically 
masked. 
For the I-cache protection, instruction memory arrays such as the I-buffer and ICRAM 
should be considered first. Also, control logic for them needs to be covered before the ITAG 
and its control logic. The tag portion of the I-cache is much less error-sensitive than the data 
portion. In conventional processors, memory arrays for both tag and data are often protected 
with ECCs, but surrounding control logic is left unprotected. Control logic errors have a short 
lifetime unless they are propagated to a storage component, whereas data errors in memory 
arrays remain active for a longer period. In this context, it is logical to protect memory arrays. 
However, highly susceptible control logic is as critical as instruction memories. 
2.5.3 Data cache 
The D-cache handles the processor's data write requests as well as reads. Accordingly, 
it requires more controls and functions with diverse soft error characteristics. Figure 2.9 is 
the SES chart for the D-cache. The SES levels of the D-cache are higher for Bubble and 
Queens than other programs because their operations are memory-intensive. However, all 
SES increases appear only in those sub-blocks that are error-sensitive for the other programs. 
More FILs seem to be sensitive than in the I-cache. The SES level of the D-cache is directly 
proportional to its access frequency. 
FIL 53 marks the validity of data in the bus. An erroneous transition from valid to invalid 
simply makes the processor wait for vahd data, whereas a transition in the opposite direction 
lets unexpected data to be delivered to the IU or SMU. A corrupted data transfer also occurs 
if FIL 54 or FIL 83 fails. FIL 54 aligns data items read from the DCRAM (FIL 83) and puts 
them on the bus. Since the functions of FIL 54 and FIL 83 are performed in a sequence, their 
SES level and pattern are very similar. FIL 56 is the most sensitive sub-block as it signals 
synchronization error, I/O error, and/or memory error in data access. Like FIL 38 in the 
I-cache, FIL 59 may modify data in the DCRAM with a false write enable signal. Other write 
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enable signals are produced by FIL 68 for tags and FIL 69 for status bits. FIL 60 acts as a sleep 
signal to the DCRAM and DTAG. Improperly disabling the D-cache results in a process failure. 
FILs 61 and 70 are the address for the D-cache access. An address error may be resolved as an 
access miss or other situations as we discussed with FIL 1. Thus, their sensitivities are close 
to that of FIL 1. FIL 63 controls bypassing data path for non-cacheable loads and stores. If it 
selects a wrong path at an active cycle, a memory transaction error occurs. 
A DTAG error creates an incorrect hit or miss decision. Miss rate on the D-cache is 
relatively high, and therefore, more false hits (erroneous decision changes from miss to hit) 
may occur than in the I-cache. Moreover, a false miss for a dirty line makes a stale data 
delivery from the memory. This is why the DTAG exhibits some error susceptibilities unlike 
the ITAG. A bit-toggle at the outputs of FIL 81 or 82 guarantees a mis-decision. On the other 
hand, faulty FIL 79 still has a possibility of avoiding false hits because the output signal is 19 
bits. We need to note that how often a fault in a FIL eventually corrupts its output signal 
is a different issue from how the output error affects the computation. The former is mainly 
related with the upset rate of the FIL and the latter is the SES that we investigate in this 
dissertation. In reality, the upset rates for FIL 79 and FIL 81 might be similar. 
When FID was increased to 500 for testing rarely sensitive sub-blocks, faults were effective 
in FILs 64, 71, and 72, but not in FILs 57 and 73 as shown in Figure 2.7. The reason for FIL 
57 is the same as FIL 44 of the ICU. FIL 73 notifies whether or not a store on a SC write miss 
is completed in the D-cache. The SC miss is a rare event. A false signaling in one direction 
induces more wait cycles and the signaling in the other direction is not very prone to a failure. 
The general protection scheme for the D-cache can be the same as the I-cache in that 
memory arrays are checked with an ECC and at least critical control sub-blocks are covered. 
For a write-back D-cache as employed in picoJava-II, up-to-date data items may be available 
only in the cache. Therefore, more integrity checking needs to considered for the D-cache than 
the I-cache. Write through policy is popular when parity protection is used. In the case of 
error detection in a cache line, simply invalidating the line accomplishes error recovery. 
2.5.4 FPU, SMU, PCSU, BIU, and MEMC 
In Figure 2.10, the SES results for the remaining FUBs are presented where FID is 1 and 
10. Apparently, the more floating point operations, the higher SES. However, the FPU here 
shows very low sensitivities. The reason for that is as follows. FIL 84 is another example of 
Figure 2.5b in asserting the start and end signal of floating point operations. The output of 
29 
FIL 85 is valid only for one or two cycles on completion of a long execution (up to 2000 cycles) 
of a floating-point instruction. It is quite unlikely for short FIDs to overlap with such a brief 
interval. To examine the SES of the FPU in the worst situation, we could have injected the 
faults when the output is active. In that case, the SES would be much higher. Separate fault 
injections into smaller logic blocks of FIL 85 are needed to understand error manifestation 
behavior at its output. 
The SMU shows zero SES in all FILs except FIL 92 for Queens. It handles spills and fills 
of the SC and manages execution pipeline in overflow and underflow conditions. An overflow 
occurs if the top of the stack pointer is smaller than the bottom of stack pointer. In comparison 
to other operations, the overflow frequency is very low. An underflow can be activated only in 
response to changes in the top of the stack pointer initiated by the return instructions, which 
account for 0.005% {Bubble), 0.001% {Crypt), 0.308% (Linpack), and 0.573% ( Queens) of total 
instructions executed in each program execution. For these reasons, faults are hardly effective 
in the SMU. FIPs that are randomly selected in our test did not coincide with the occasional 
SMU active cycles. 
Even if FID is 500 (Figure 2.7), FILs 90, 91, 94, and 96 have no changes in the SES. When 
FID 90 asserts a write enable, the output of FIL 89 is latched. Since the state of FIL 89 does 
not vary often, additional writes by erroneous FID 90 have usually no special impact. FIL 91 
generates pipeline stalls. Holding the pipeline for extra cycles introduces an operation delay, 
but not a process failure. FIL 94 requests loads solely on a SC fill or an underflow. FIL 96 tells 
the DCU that a data request is a non-allocate store. This has no effect in the case of a D-cache 
hit, but on a miss, data item is directly written to the memory. Erroneous switching by FIL 
96 between caching or non-caching data cannot alter the correctness of computation unless it 
caches data from a non cacheable address region. Based on the observation, the SMU can be 
the last FUB to consider for integrity checking. Since the SMU mainly consists of random 
logic, the lifespan of errors in the SMU caused by temporary hardware failures is short. 
FIL 97 requests the IU to take a trap when there is an interrupt by an external device. 
The trap is however not taken when the interrupt mask bit of the processor state register 
is 0, making faults ineffective. FIL 99 signals a power-down to other FUBs. Unless the IU 
executes a power-down instruction, indicated by FIL 24, no response is made. Accordingly, its 
SES is zero. Erroneously triggering a standby when the FUBs are not ready leads the process 
to fail, whereas not going into the standby mode even at a right timing does not trouble 
normal execution. Considering this unique characteristic, the power-down control logic needs 
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a protection from the former case only. The PCSU is placed in a fault tolerant position like 
Figure 2.5b. 
As clearly seen in the figure, handshaking signals by FIL 100, 101, and 109 are error-
sensitive during memory transactions between the BIU and the caches or the BIU and MEMC. 
A false bus acknowledgment causes the processor to hang or crash. Other FILs except FIL 107 
are less sensitive because their faulty signals neither initiate nor terminate bus transactions. 
Data errors directly propagate through memory transactions. Thus, ensuring the integrity of 
handshaking activity along with data check is a critical component, qualifying for protection 
redundancy. 
2.5.5 FUB-level SES 
Figure 2.11 visualizes our SES estimate of the picoJava-II processor. The average SES of 
each FUB is quantized into one of 10 shade levels after weighting the areas and sensitivities of 
FILs in the FUB. A higher SES is represented by a darker shade. 
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2.6 Summary 
To cope with increasing demand for dependability enhancement in today's processors, un­
derstanding its behavior under faulty environments is a fundamental step. We have conducted 
fault injection simulations on a commercial product, picoJava-II, to characterize the soft error 
sensitivities of its components. We summarize our analysis as follows. 
• Many processor components are seldom susceptible to soft errors, while there are a few 
components with a very high SES. The SES of a component is determined by its architec­
tural function; logical situation, governing processor behavior directly or in collaboration 
with other components; and active cycle/frequency. A logic block may have an inherent 
capability of fault masking to some degree. 
• Workload variation does not convert a critical component to a non-critical component in 
terms of SES, or vice versa. Although minor changes in the SES level and the pattern of 
failures can be induced by different workloads, clear distinction between first-protect and 
last-protect components is constant. As a result, the SES is an effective standard for pri­
oritizing the integrity checking of various processor components to enhance dependability. 
• Soft errors in control logic generally have a shorter lifetime than those in the memory 
arrays. Controlling program flow and bus transaction is more error-sensitive than other 
controls. Therefore, protection can start with memory, which is already common in many 
microprocessors, and then include critical random logic. 
• The sensitivities of many components are fairly predictable from processor architecture 
and organization. The amount of efforts to estimate the SES data is adjustable with 
varying degree of accuracy. Different levels in processor model hierarchy can be selected 
for the estimation. This enables the designer to meet time-to-market requirements, while 
achieving a resource-efficient increase in processor dependability. 
Fault injection has been commonly used to judge their effectiveness after fault tolerance 
techniques are implemented into a processor. Our study demonstrates that fault injection 
is also a suitable method to improve the protection efficiency of the techniques in an early 
development stage. 
CHAPTER 3 Integrity Checking Architectures for Memory Arrays 
Information integrity in cache memories is a fundamental requirement for dependable com­
puting. Conventional architectures for enhancing cache reliability using check codes make it 
difficult to trade between the level of data integrity and the chip area requirement. We focus 
on transient fault tolerance in primary cache memories and develop new architectural solutions 
to maximize fault coverage when the budgeted silicon area is not sufficient for the conventional 
configuration of an error checking code. The underlying idea is to exploit the corollary of refer­
ence locality in the organization and management of the code. A higher protection priority is 
dynamically assigned to the portions of the cache that are more error-prone and have a higher 
probability of access. The error-prone likelihood prediction is based on the access frequency. 
We evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed schemes using a trace-driven simulation com­
bined with software error injection using four different fault manifestation models. From the 
simulation results, we show that for most benchmarks the proposed architectures are effective 
and area efficient for increasing the cache integrity under all four models. 
3.1 Conventional Memory Protection 
Memory hierarchy is one of the most important elements in modern computer systems. The 
reliability of the memory significantly affects the overall system dependability. The purposes 
of integrating an error checking scheme in the memory system are to prevent any error that 
has occurred in the memory from propagating to other components and to overcome the effects 
of errors locally, contributing to the overall goal of achieving failure-free computation. 
Transient faults can corrupt information in the memory, i.e., instruction and data errors. 
These soft errors may result in erroneous computation. In particular, errors in cache memory, 
which is the closest data storage to the CPU, can easily propagate into the processor registers 
and other memory elements, and eventually cause computation failures. Although the cache 
memory quality has improved tremendously due to advances in VLSI technology, it is not 
possible to completely avoid transient fault occurrence. As a result, data integrity checking, 
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i.e., detecting and correcting soft errors, is frequently used in cache memories. 
The primary technique for ensuring data integrity is the addition of information redundancy 
to the original data. Whenever a data item is written into the cache, a check (or protection) 
code such as parity or error-correcting code (ECC) is also included. We denote a pair of data 
and check code by a parity group. When an item is requested, the corresponding parity group 
is read and an error syndrome is generated to check and correct the error if there is one. The 
capability of the protection code needs to be determined properly depending on the degree of 
required data integrity, expected error rate based on harshness of the operating environment, 
and design and test cost. 
Despite the fact that predicting the exact rate and behavior of transient faults in a system 
is not possible, current data integrity checking schemes for caches are generally selected on a 
single-bit failure model basis. Thus, byte-parity scheme (one bit parity per 8-bit data) [80] 
and single error correcting-double error detecting (SEC-DED) code [71] are widespread. Many 
higher capability codes for byte or burst error control have also been studied [8], [74]. 
Check codes employed for increased reliability in the caches are constructed in a uniform 
structure, i.e., every unit of data is protected by a check code of the chosen capability. This 
conventional method is reasonable under the assumption that each cache item has the same 
probability of error occurrence. However, it has the following deficiencies. 
e Check code in the uniform structure is an expensive way to enhance cache reliability. 
Therefore, it is overkill under extremely low error rates. 
• It is not flexible in terms of chip area requirement, as the area occupied by the check 
code is directly proportional to the cache size. If the budgeted area is not sufficient for 
the uniform structure, no intermediate architectures are currently available. The high 
overhead may result in sacrificing the integrity checking. 
The uniform structure enables every item to be checked. However, error checking is neces­
sary only for those items that are likely to be corrupted. If it is possible to predict such cache 
items, a higher data integrity can be achieved with a smaller amount of chip area for the check 
code. In practice, there are several reasons that soft error occurrence tends to concentrate in a 
few locations. Information in the cache can be altered during read/write operations due to low 
noise margins, and thus cache lines that are frequently accessed may have a higher probability 
of corruption. Cross-coupling effects may also induce errors in neighboring locations of a line 
being accessed. On the other hand, global random disturbances commonly affect any location. 
More importantly, errors in unused lines are no concern. 
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In this chapter, we take these factors into account to develop area efficient architectural 
solutions for improving cache integrity. The underlying idea is that more error-prone and more 
likely used cache lines must be protected first. The random faults are not biased to a specific 
location or time. However, if a fault occurs during the access of a line, it is more likely to affect 
the data being accessed. As a result, access frequency makes a difference in the probability 
of error occurrence between active (more access) and inactive (less access) lines. With large 
caches, the majority of cache accesses are usually localized in a small portion of the cache. 
This frequently accessed part is considered more error-prone. The corrupted items in the most 
frequently used (MFU) lines are likely to be used as instructions or operands, quickly affecting 
the computation. On the other hand, errors in inactive lines have a higher probability of being 
replaced or overwritten with new, correct data [79]. Data errors are harmful only if they are 
used for operation, suggesting that not providing check codes for inactive lines may not affect 
the integrity of the computation. 
We present three new architectures, parity caching, shadow checking, and selective checking, 
to protect primary caches. These schemes allow flexible trade-offs between silicon area and 
level of data integrity so that both the reliability and area requirements can be met. The new 
schemes can achieve an acceptably high level of fault coverage with much less area than the 
uniform structure, realizing area efficient enhancement of cache system reliability. 
3.2 Errors in Cache and Their Effects 
To reduce CPU-memory bandwidth gap, up to 60% of the area of recent microprocessors is 
dedicated to caches and other memory latency-hiding hardwares [75]. The cache memory stores 
instructions or data in data RAM along with address tags in tag RAM. The primary caches are 
required to operate at the processor's clock speed. Use of lower voltage levels, high speed data 
read/write operations, and extremely dense circuitry increase the probability of transient fault 
occurrence, resulting in more bit errors in cache memories. Moreover, external disturbances 
such as noise, power jitter, local heat densities, and ionization due to alpha-particle hits [76] 
can also corrupt the information. 
Figure 3.1 shows how the state of a cache data block is affected by error occurrence and 
recovery. Initially, the block is error-free (State N). Single- and multiple-bit errors due to 
some transient faults lead to State S and State M, respectively. The state of a corrupted 
block changes back to State N if the error is overwritten by a new correct item or is corrected 
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by a recovery mechanism. The absorbing state, F, represents the situation where an error 
propagates outside the cache boundary through a normal access. If the cache memory always 
operates in State N (Pnn = 1) or erroneous items are never used, then no fault tolerance 
schemes are necessary. However, in practice, this is not likely to be the case. The check codes 
help keep Psu and Pmn nearly equal to 1 so that the cache block rarely reaches State F (i.e., 
P S F  —  P m f  —  0 ) .  
One may suspect that extremely infrequent error propagation (0 # P$f << 1, 0 ^ Pmf << 
1) may not have any notable effects. However, even a single-bit error can bring a complete 
system failure. Through program execution, corrupted data items propagate to the processor's 
registers and produce an erroneous outcome that can eventually propagate to the external 
world. A single error can also spread to other registers, cache lines, and memory locations 
as the processor continues to use the corrupted data recursively. The erroneous contents of 
registers can also cause page or segmentation faults and incorrect control flow changes. It is 
shown in [79] that the probability of a single bit leading to a failure is about 50%. However, 
the actual probability heavily depends on the cache hit rate. 
Bit changes in the tag RAM also cause the following improper cache hit and miss decisions 
that make the processor's memory references chaotic. 
• Pseudo-hit: the tag portion of the incoming reference address matches with the wrong 
cache line's tag field. 
• Pseudo-miss: the tag associated with the desired data item does not match with the 
reference address. 
• Multi-hit: the tag portion of the reference address matches with the tags of multiple lines 
in a set. 
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In the case of a pseudo-hit, the processor gets wrong data on a read and updates the data in 
the wrong location on a write. A pseudo-miss generates an unnecessary main memory access. 
The multi-hit may be detected by the cache controller without check code support for the tags, 
but handling is not simple. The controller cannot distinguish between the multiple hit lines to 
service the processor's request. Moreover, invalidating all of those lines and treating the access 
as a miss is not a solution if any of the Unes are dirty, i.e., valid data may exist only in the 
cache. Writing the data back to main memory should precede the invalidation of a dirty line. 
However, this cannot be done without resolving the line selection problem. Thus, a resolution 
may not be possible or may lead to data consistency failure. 
Due to an error in the cache status field, a valid line can be unintentionally invalidated if 
its valid bit is changed erroneously. In the case of a dirty bit error, a dirty line is considered 
to be clean and may be replaced without a write-back. Therefore, the most recent data can 
be lost. Line replacement based on access history can also be performed improperly if faults 
flip the corresponding history bits. 
3.3 New Architectural Approaches 
In conventional systems, data integrity checking schemes are implemented in a uniform 
structure. In this section, we describe three alternative architectures that have flexible chip 
area requirements. The parity caching scheme described in section 3.3.1 is proposed as a 
substitute for uniformly organized check code under extremely low error rates, section 3.3.2 
describes shadow checking, which is an inexpensive variant of replication architecture under 
very noisy environments. Selective checking is presented in section 3.3.3 as a simpler alternative 
to the first two when a cache has multi-way set associativity. In section 3.3.4, we also discuss 
integration of cache scrubbing [77] into the proposed architectures to enhance their capabilities. 
A data read/write involves accessing cache cell arrays including data, tag, and status bits. 
Errors can appear in any field. Therefore, integrity checking is required for all three fields. 
For brevity in presentation, we do not always address the proposed schemes separately for 
each field. However, the operation and management mechanisms apply to all three fields in an 
identical manner. 
38 
3.3.1 Parity caching 
One of the widely known program properties is that only 10% of program instructions are 
responsible for 90% of instructions executed [70]. For some programs, a similar observation 
can be made in the data segment of main memory. Cache accesses are also often localized. 
Under considerably low error environments, it can be expected that most soft errors of any 
significance will occur in these most commonly used portions of instructions and data. 
In a low error rate environment, when the budgeted area is not sufficient for the check 
codes of the uniform structure, the number of check codes needs not be continuously increased 
with the primary cache size to maintain high data integrity. Based on the assumption that the 
MFU lines are most error-prone and errors in those lines easily propagate unless checked, we 
organize a parity cache, whose entries contain the check codes for the MFU lines. This scheme 
is called parity caching: the caching of check codes. 
The organization and operation of the parity cache are similar to general cache memories, 
but it provides integrity checking for the main cache. It covers the most error-prone main 
cache locations using log?l index bits, where I is the number of lines in the main cache. The 
number of parity cache entries, n, is smaller than I. The main cache lines for which check 
codes are held in the parity cache are selected dynamically such that the MFU portion of the 
cache can be protected first. This is accomplished by employing least recently used (LRU) 
replacement policy for the parity cache, where the entry that has not been used for the longest 
time is replaced with a new item. 
Figure 3.2 shows the logical organization of a 16KB direct-mapped data cache or D-cache 
(left half) protected by a parity cache of 16 entries (right half) in conjunction with an ECC 
unit. The 16 parity cache entries are organized in a 4-way set associative manner and store 
check codes for 16 lines selected from the main cache. The ECC unit performs error checking. 
The parity cache type and the check code capability can be flexibly determined. The main 
data line consists of 32 bytes, and 32 parity bits (1 per byte) are used for its protection. The 
tag is protected with a SEC-DEC code. For the status bits, one even parity bit is used. 
For the mapping between the parity and main caches, each entry in the parity cache is 
tagged. In the case of direct-mapped main caches, the index field of a reference address is 
used for the parity cache tag as it exactly corresponds to one line in the main cache. In the 
example above, the first seven bits of the index are stored as a tag and the last two bits 
are used in selecting a set in the parity cache. Note that the number of parity tag bits is 
small in comparison to the main cache tag, resulting in simpler tag comparators. If the parity 
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Figure 3.2 A 16KB D-cache and a parity cache. 
cache uses direct-mapping, the tag is reduced to five bits. If the main cache is A;-way {k > 1) 
set associative, multiple lines of the same index value can coexist in the main cache and one 
parity entry may erroneously be mapped to all of those Unes. This problem is solved by 
storing additional logik bits in the parity tag to distinguish the correct line from k ways. In 
this section, we apply the parity caching only to direct-mapped main caches. We present an 
alternate method (selective checking) for set associative main caches in section 3.3.3. 
While the main cache serves the processor's request, the parity cache synchronously moni­
tors the integrity of the main cache and updates the check codes. This is the same as existing 
systems with the uniform array of check codes, and so, no additional delay in cache access time 
is needed. When a miss occurs in the main cache, new data items are fetched from the lower 
level memory with check codes, and they are written into the parity cache in a free entry, if 
any, or replace the LRU entry of the mapped set. Whenever a read hit occurs in both caches, 
error checking on all three fields of the line is performed using the ECC unit. Handling errors 
is the same as in the conventional systems. Whenever a main cache Une is replaced, the check 
codes in the corresponding parity entry are also updated for the new line. Thereby, a hit in 
only the parity cache never occurs. 
If the parity cache misses the entry for a data block being requested by the processor, 
the integrity checking cannot be processed. In this case, the check codes are computed from 
the data in the main cache and stored in a selected parity entry for future protection. If 
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Figure 3.3 Check code area model. 
the accessed line has a corrupted item, error propagation is possible. Check codes generated 
using erroneous data do not help error checking. This event is denoted by misconstruction. 
Although the error does not always propagate, we assume the worst case and treat it as error 
propagation in the evaluation of the scheme. 
The area estimate of the parity cache is obtained from an on-chip cache area model pre­
sented by Mulder et al. in [73]. They have used the technology independent notion of a 
register-bit equivalent or rbe. One rbe equals the area of a one-bit register storage cell that 
has the highest bandwidth. The static storage cell of medium bandwidth that we use here has 
been empirically determined to be 0.6 rbe. Thereby, an area represented in rbe for register cells 
is converted to static cell area by multiplying by a factor of 0.6. 
Figure 3.3 depicts the check code array of a conventional cache in the uniform structure 
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and a k-way set associative parity cache (k = 4). We denote the total area of the two models 
by SC and SP, respectively. Let be the width of an element E and let CC represent the 
check code. The area is the sum of areas of all memory elements and is given by 
•Sc = -4(CC for tag) 4- A(CC for status bits) + A(CC for data) 
+ A(drivers) + A(bitline sense amplifiers), (3.1) 
Sp = A(CC + ovhdQQ) +A(tag + ovhdfag + status 
+ ovhd3tatus) + A(control), (3.2) 
where A(M) and ovhdt denote the area of module M and the overhead for element E, respec­
tively. The ovhde includes comparators if any, drivers, and sense amps. In the implementation 
of MIPS-X [68], W compare, Wdriver^ ^ Wsense-amp are approximately 6 rbe each. For a 
static cell array of I x Wqq bits (Figure 3.3a), the total size (Eqn. (3.1)) is 
Sc = 0.6(Wçç + ^ driver)^ Wsense-amp) 
= 0.6(Wcc+6)(Z + 6), 
where Wqq = Wqq jor ^ag + WçC for status bits ^CC for data-
The control logic for the parity cache can be implemented in a programmable logic array 
(PL A) as a part of the main cache controller. A PL A of 130 rbe is presumed according to [73]. 
From Eqn. (3.2), the area of a A>way parity cache of n entries for k ^ n (Figure 3.3b) is 
obtained as 
•Sp = 0.6(WCC k+ 6)(£ + 6) + 0.6{(Ws<otus + Wtag) • k 
+ 6}•(— + 6 + 6) + 130 
= 0.6n (Acc • Wcc + &tag(wstatus + wtag)) + 195, (3.3) 
where Wsiatus = LRU bits + valid bit + parity for the tag = log2* + 1 + 1, Wtag = log2Z — log2n + log2fc = 
log2^' ACC = 1 + ¥ + w^> Atag = 1 + -^ + {wtag+wstatus).k-
To compare the areas of the two organizations, we compute relative area ratio1 (RAR). The 
RAR for parity caching equals Figure 3.4 plots the RARs for various sets of configuration 
parameters: check code type, data unit size, number of parity entry, and associativity. Con­
sidering current microprocessors, two main cache sizes, 16KB for instruction cache (I-cache) 
and 32KB for D-cache, are compared. However, some microprocessors employ larger caches. 
In that case, the RARs become even better for parity caching. The number of check bits 
lWe also use this metric for shadow checking and selective checking. 
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Figure 3.4 Relative area requirement. 
per entry corresponds to Wqq. Four values are compared, representing different protection 
capabilities. Several conclusions can be drawn. An increase in check code width results in a 
decrease in the RAR. Obviously, more overhead is required for higher associativity and the 
RAR is proportional to the number of entries. The parity cache with an RAR of less than 1 is 
of interest to us. The corresponding protection coverages for these organizations are given in 
section 3.5. 
3.3.2 Shadow checking 
For applications that require very high data integrity or operate under highly noisy envi­
ronments, parity- and ECC-based protection cannot be satisfactory. One general approach in 
this case is to use replicated architecture such as N modular redundancy (NMR) with majority 
voting, but it is very expensive. Instead of full replications, we present an alternative approach, 
called shadow checking, where multiple copies are partially supported to meet a budgeted area 
which is not adequate for a complete NMR. The copies of the MFU lines are stored in shadow 
cache. The underlying idea is the same as parity caching, but the shadow cache performs error 
checking by means of comparison using the copies of data rather than check codes. The goal 
is to obtain a high reliability enhancement even in the presence of multiple-bit errors with 
smaller chip area overhead. 
Figure 3.5a shows the diagram of shadow checking architecture. Depending on space avail­
ability, N identical additional cache modules, called shadow i for 1 < i < N, are included in 
the shadow cache. We adopt the same address mapping mechanism used in parity caching. 
Figure 3.5b depicts a parity group, j, consisting of a shadow cache tag and N copies of infor-
43 
• Bus 
interface 
Tag 
Comparator or voter 
Shadow cache 
XOR 
R/yv buffer 
Shadowl Shack) w2 
Main 
cache 
Second level cache (L2) or memory 
Processing unit 
(a) Basic organization 
3al i sub block 
copy 1 copy 2 
Tag Tag Tag 
J Tag Da a f aid 
Shadowl Shadow2 
Shadow cache Main cache Parity group j 
(b) Components of parity group 
Figure 3.5 Shadow checking architecture. 
mation, each of which contains tag, status, and data bits. The shadow cache operates like a 
shadow of the main cache. Data written into the main cache is also written into the shadow 
cache along with the corresponding tag and status bits in parallel. Error checking is performed 
on read hits in both caches, and its effect depends on the number of erroneous shadow modules 
and their error patterns. This is equivalent to known reliability gain in an NMR system [78]. 
Thus, we do not discuss it here. 
We show the advantages of shadow checking over full replication with respect to chip 
area requirement and resultant reliability enhancement. In the comparison, we ignore the 
common factors of the two architectures such as comparator/voter reliability and delay, and 
synchronization cost. Figure 3.6 shows the RARs of a shadow cache of two shadow modules in 
comparison with a triple modular redundant (TMR) cache using the same area model presented 
in section 3.3.1. The RARs are smaller than those of a parity cache for the same parameters 
due to the higher overhead of a conventional TMR system. 
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3.3.3 Selective checking 
Parity caching and shadow checking have been proposed as alternative architectures to 
the uniform check code structure and replication method, respectively. If the main cache has 
k-way (k > 2) set associativity, we can also configure redundancy in a simpler manner. Out of 
k lines per set, only s lines (1 < s < k) are selected to assign the check codes. Similar to the 
previous two schemes, line selection is based on the access frequency. We simply choose the 
most recently used (MRU) Unes of each set for error checking with the expectation that those 
lines are MFU, and thus error-prone and Ukely to be accessed in near future. We call this 
scheme selective checking. It is obvious that the RAR for selective checking is approximately 
S 
k ' 
Figure 3.7 depicts a comparison of redundant code organizations between conventional 
approaches (left column) and selective checking (right column) for k = 4 and s = 1. Many 
commercial microprocessors use byte-parity or SEC-DED codes in the uniform structure as 
shown in Figure 3.7a. Alternatively, in selective checking with s = 1 (Figure 3.7b), for Set 
i, only the MRU line is protected by a check code. (If s > 2, s MRU lines are guarded.) 
Each check code entry is independently assigned to any Une of a set while keeping track of the 
MRU. Similar concepts can be applied to the NMR cache (Figure 3.7c) for a selective NMR 
(Figure 3.7d) where N copies are maintained for only the MRU portions. In the case of a 
miss, a line is fetched from memory with check code and it becomes the MRU line. Whenever 
the MRU line is requested, the cache controUer recognizes that the current check code belongs 
to the MRU and performs error correction. As a result, no tag and resultant overhead are 
necessary to achieve dynamic mapping. 
The reliability of a cache that is already equipped with a check code can be further enhanced 
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in many ways. One approach is to expand the check code with more check bits as shown in 
Figure 3.7e. The new wider check code has a higher checking capability. In case the full 
expansion is not affordable, we can adopt the selective structure here. Only s additional code 
entries for each set are provided to enhance the protection of the MRU lines. Figure 3.7f shows 
the selective expansion for s = I. The combination of primary and expanded check codes is 
called enhanced check code. The primary check code is separable from the enhanced check 
code. The expanded code is built in such a way that the chosen line is protected by more 
intensive checking in conjunction with primary check code. Any non-MRU line of a set turns 
into a new MRU line whenever it is accessed. In this case, only the checking by the primary 
code is valid. The expanded code is ignored and is replaced by the code for a new MRU line. 
Other basic operations of enhanced check codes are the same as for the previous cases. 
In selective checking, the redundant code entry is constructed for only s {< k) lines per set. 
Thus, the redundant codes are always evenly distributed over different sets irrespective of their 
usage frequency. On the other hand, the parity and shadow caches maintain the redundant 
code entries for the MFU lines in the range of the entire main cache. This results in differences 
in cost and protection coverage of the selective checking compared to the other two schemes. 
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3.3.4 Cache scrubbing 
For most programs, less than 30% of instructions are memory references. The D-cache is 
occupied during the executions of those instructions. Depending on the processor architecture, 
some D-cache cycles may be idle. To further enhance the data integrity, we can scrub off 
the latent errors in the D-cache whenever possible. Soft error scrubbing is accomplished by 
reading out the data and check bits, verifying their correctness, and writing back the corrected 
data [77]. Scrubbing is more advantageous to caches protected by a low capability check code. 
Since in our proposed schemes we shrink the check code array, we suggest the use of the 
cache scrubbing technique to increase the protection coverage. On every idle cycle, the cache 
controller executes a single scrubbing cycle using an entry from the check code array and 
its corresponding line in the cache. One question that arises here is how to pick a line for 
scrubbing. Random selection is the easiest method to implement but performance may be 
poor. Intuitively, it could be beneficial to check the lines whose check codes are expected to be 
discarded soon to make room for new codes. These can be the LRU lines in consideration of 
temporal locality. By also taking spatial locality into account, lines away from the MRU Une 
and their neighboring lines can also be selected. 
3.4 Error Model and Evaluation Methodology 
For the evaluation of the schemes, we employed a trace-driven simulation combined with 
software error injection. An error injection process inverts a single or multiple bits in any field 
of a selected Une. To reflect diverse possible fault manifestation patterns, we conducted error 
injection based on the following four error models. 
1. For a cache item access, the mapped line/set in the RAM is activated and probed. Any 
fault during the access can result in errors in the Une being accessed. Thus, a higher 
error probabiUty is expected in more frequently accessed lines. Under this error model, 
the error injection is executed in the target line right after the access. We call this direct 
injection. 
2. Cross-coupling effects of faults can generate errors in the adjoining Unes of the currently 
accessed line. During a Une access, an error is injected in a neighboring line on either 
side. We call this adjacent injection. 
3. Independent of line access, external disturbances and single-event upsets can generate 
soft errors in any location at any time. To simulate this occasion, an error is injected in 
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a random location at a random time. This is called random injection. 
4. Unlike previous models, faults can cause errors in a group such as column, row, or cell 
cluster. Only column errors can induce a performance difference between the conventional 
and proposed architectures. Thus, we include a model, called column injection, where 
an error is injected in every row of a selected column. This model is added to examine 
the schemes' performance in the worst situation. 
All error models apply to both the main and protection cache or array. The accuracy of 
error models depends on the nature of the physical faults. Fault behavior and the distribution of 
different types of faults are likely to vary depending on the operational environment. Therefore, 
it is very difficult to judge which error model is dominant and realistic in a general situation. 
For this reason, we carried out a set of simulation experiments for each model separately. 
Table 3.1 Base cache parameters. 
Parameters Main cache 1 Parity/Shadow cache 
Size l-cache: 16KB, D-cache: 32KB 256 check code entries 
Associativity Direct-mapped I 4-way set associative 
Replacement Least recently used (LRU) line first 
Write policy Write-throuqh, write around 
Line size 32 Bytes I 32 Bytes (shadow) 
The simulations were performed on-the-fly and every operation was handled on a clock-by-
clock basis, assuming that a single instruction is issued and finished in every clock cycle on 
a perfectly pipelined processor. The same protection scheme was applied to both the I-cache 
and D-cache on each simulation run. Table 3.1 lists the base cache parameters used for the 
simulations unless specified otherwise. All programs of SPEC95 suite [81] were instrumented 
on the Sun Ultral model using Sun's Shade tool V5.32C [69]. Table 3.2 shows input files and 
memory access rates of the programs and hit rates on the base caches. These benchmarks 
provide a range of computation and memory access patterns, and their instruction and data 
sets are much larger than the simulated cache sizes. All benchmarks' executable files were 
built using Sun Workshop Compilers, cc and f77, with the optimization flags -fast, -x04, 
and -xdepend. 
The moment at which the decision of an error injection is made is defined as an injection 
decision point (IDP). For direct and adjacent injection models, the end of each read/write 
access cycle was considered as an IDP, while the trailing edge of every CPU clock cycle was 
used for random and column injections. At each IDP, an error (multiple errors for the column 
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injection) is injected with a constant probability, which is set to 10-6 for direct and adjacent, 
0.2 x 10-6 for random, and 0.5 x 10-8 for column injection. These are accelerated rates for the 
rare events. If an item selected for the error injection already has an error, no additional error 
is injected. The number of error injections, /, at N IDPs is a binomial random variable and the 
error injection rate is I/N. To ignore initial warm up routines, the error injection was started 
after the first 10 million instructions while the caches operated under normal conditions. Errors 
were injected independently for the next 500 million instruction executions and no injection 
was performed afterward. In consideration of latent errors, the simulations were terminated 
after the following 100 million instructions. 
Table 3.2 Summary of benchmarks. 
Benchmark Input file Load(%) Store (%) l-cache (%) D-cache (%) 
compress biqtest.in 7.20 2.16 99.99 84.68 
acc cp-decl. i 19.34 5.52 96.40 93.83 
ao 9stone21.in 18.79 6.77 97.74 93.60 
iipeq viqo.ppm 17.03 6.60 99.91 89.74 
li * . Isp 20.89 9.89 98.61 93.66 
m88ksim ctl.in 17.17 9.95 97.47 98.33 
cerl primes.in 26.03 12.41 96.08 95.76 
vortex vortex.in 18.74 8.47 95.10 91.23 
SPECinl95 18.15 7.72 97.66 92.60 
applu applu.in 25.43 11.40 99.99 86.25 
apsi apsi.in 28.81 12.83 99.76 88.57 
fpppp natoms.in 38.21 11.04 93.66 96.69 
hvdro2d hvdro2d.in 21.65 9.28 99.52 75.03 
mqrid mqrid.in 38.29 19.84 99.99 95.68 
su2cor su2cor.in 22.24 7.23 97.11 91.52 
swim swim.in 24.34 10.35 99.99 79.19 
tomcatv tomcatv.in 22.20 7.74 97.47 92.57 
turb3d turb3d.in 17.16 12.24 99.90 93.25 
waves waveS. in 19.33 10.26 97.95 84.01 
SPECfpSS 25.77 11.22 98.53 88.28 
The performance comparison targets for the proposed schemes are uniformly organized 
check code and replication. The number of error bits per injection is not an important factor 
in the comparison because the same capability of the unit protection code is assumed. Only the 
number of code entries is different. The parity cache was implemented with a SEC-DED code, 
and single-bit errors were injected. D-cache scrubbing was tested along with parity caching. A 
shadow cache of two shadow modules was compared with a general TMR cache. To simulate a 
harsher environment for shadow checking, multiple-bit errors were used. Although we proposed 
three organizations for selective checking, the main idea of the three is common. Therefore, 
we investigated only a simple case where only s entries of SEC-DED codes are maintained for 
each main cache set (Figure 3.7b) with single-bit error injection. 
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Our main interest is how many injected errors propagate to other components under the 
proposed schemes. For a quantitative performance measurement, we use error propagation 
rate (EPR), defined by 
gpjl _ total number of errors propagated 
total number of errors injected 
3.5 Results and Analysis 
This section reports the performance of the three proposed architectures. Instead of pre­
senting the simulation results in an exhaustive manner for all parameters, we focus only on 
the salient features to gain insight into how the parameters affect the protection capabilities 
of the schemes. 
3.5.1 The performance of parity caching 
Recall that single-bit errors in cache protected by SEC-DED code in the conventional 
uniform manner cannot propagate (i.e., EPR = 0%). Figure 3.8 shows the EPRs under the 
protection of two independent parity caches whose RARs are 0.58 and 0.30 for checking the 
I-cache and D-cache, respectively. The results of the four error models are compared. If we 
assume that error propagation is equally likely to occur in all locations, the expected EPRs 
with the check codes of these areas would be 42% and 70% (identified by thick dashed-lines in 
the figures), respectively. However, in most cases, the EPRs are much lower than these values 
because the distribution of error propagation is not uniform. Organizing the check codes in a 
cache makes the most of the budgeted area to prevent errors from propagating. 
Under the direct error injection model, for all benchmarks except swim, the small parity 
cache allows less than about 3% of injected errors to propagate. This is because this error 
model and the applications match well with the premise on which parity caching is developed. 
Due to spatial locality, the parity cache also provides relatively high protection coverage in 
the adjacent error model. However, we observe larger EPRs on the D-cache for compress, ijpeg 
and swim. One common attribute of these benchmarks is that their data access does not show 
good locality, as can be ascertained from their low hit rates in the D-cache given in Table 3.2. 
The hit rate in the parity cache is even lower. Thus, more items in the D-cache, whose check 
codes are not present in the parity cache, can be requested. In this case, error propagation 
takes place unless the items are error-free. 
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Even if error occurrence is evenly distributed (i.e., random error model), localized error 
propagation makes the parity cache area efficient. In the column error model where every Une 
gets an error injection, the results are not very promising. Once a column error injection is 
executed, any read miss in the parity cache after that results in an error propagation. The 
column error injection is the worst case test model. Nevertheless, if we consider the area 
occupancy, on average parity caching provides more protection coverage with a given area as 
shown in Figures 3.8c and 3.8d. 
Table 3.3 EPR (%) vs. the number of parity entries. 
Cache type I-cache D-cache 
No. of entries 32 64 128 256 32 64 128 256 
RAR 0.13 0.20 0.33 0.58 0.07 0.10 0.17 0.30 
compress 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.33 2.08 0.00 2.08 
pce 6.84 5.34 2.99 1.28 1.85 1.85 0.00 0.00 
ao 7.59 6.29 3.04 1.08 3.91 0.78 0.00 0.78 
iipea 6.35 3.94 3.94 1.31 5.30 5.30 6.06 0.76 
li 5.38 1.79 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
m88ksim 4.57 4.35 3.48 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
perl 13.51 8.50 3.27 0.00 3.28 1.09 0.00 0.00 
vortex 12.33 7.71 2.86 1.32 2.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 
•5 SPECIntSS 7.07 4.74 2.47 0.65 3.13 1.39 0.76 0.45 
I apolu 10.75 8.55 3.51 3.07 2.65 1.06 0.00 0.00 $ aosi 5.42 3.65 0.65 0.00 14.16 12.79 4.11 0.00 
S foPDD 6.64 5.72 4.35 1.83 13.71 5.65 1.61 0.00 hydro2d 1.36 1.36 1.36 0.91 1.94 1.29 0.00 0.00 
mqrid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.52 1.89 0.38 0.38 
su2cor 10.11 9.67 8.35 1.76 0.67 1.34 0.00 0.00 
swim 2.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 29.14 37.09 39.74 41.06 
tomcatv 8.22 8.22 7.31 2.05 2.40 1.80 0.00 0.00 
Il turb3d 4.55 1.73 1.08 0.00 17.53 5.19 0.65 0.00 
! waves 9.75 4.08 0.00 0.00 3.25 1.30 0.65 0.65 
II SPECfpSS 5.90 4.30 2.66 0.96 8.69 6.94 4.71 4.21 
Table 3.3 gives the EPRs on the direct error model for an increasing number of check code 
entries along with RARs. Only 32 entries, which occupy 13% and 7% of the area needed for the 
uniform structure for the I-cache and D-cache, respectively, bring significantly high coverages. 
Again, this results from the fact that for many appUcations the cache access is localized to a 
very small region. Interestingly, swim exhibits a different attribute: as more entries are added, 
the EPR increases. For swim, it turns out that increasing the parity cache associativity is more 
beneficial than increasing the size. The EPR is reduced to 0.66% on the 16-way set associative 
parity cache of 256 entries. 
Some errors can be removed by normal write operations. Figure 3.9a depicts the portion 
of overwritten errors out of total injected errors. In the I-cache, only an instruction miss 
generates a write, while a store request also causes a write in the D-cache. This is why the 
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overwritten error rate is higher for the D-cache than for the I-cache. The results presented so 
far are collected from parity caching in combination with error scrubbing (D-cache only). In 
the case of fewer entries, errors eliminated by scrubbing account for a large portion of total 
eliminated errors as shown in Figure 3.9b. This is because the number of scrubbing cycles 
executed per check code entry is larger in a small parity cache. As the parity cache includes 
more entries, error removal at read access time becomes dominant for most applications. 
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Figure 3.9 Error removal. 
We also present the average EPRs for other parameters. From Figure 3.10a we note that 
higher parity cache associativity enhances the error checking capability. However, the increase 
becomes insignificant with more than 8-way associativity. On the other hand, area requirement 
grows rapidly (RARs are plotted on the right vertical axis). 
In Figure 3.10b, base parameter set consists of LRU policy for entry replacement, error 
scrubbing, and random entry selection for scrubbing. For performance comparison, three 
additional simulations were performed with only one parameter variation at a time. Due to 
the small number of check code entries, one may question if a simpler replacement can affect 
the coverage. We tested a pseudo-random policy. The LRU strategy performs slightly better 
on the D-cache for SPECint95. It is, however, a little less efficient than the pseudo-random 
policy in the other cases. From the results, we conclude that the replacement policy does not 
significantly affect the performance. In section 3.3.4, we discussed the entry selection issue for 
error scrubbing. As shown in the graph, the performance gain from LRU entry selection for 
scrubbing is insignificant. The results without scrubbing are also shown. Scrubbing mostly 
improves the coverage at the cost of hardware complexity. 
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Figure 3.10 Effects of other parameters. 
Thus far we have discussed the effect of other parameters on the parity cache performance 
only in the case of the direct error model. However, similar effects of parameters were noted 
from the results of simulations under the other three models. We omit them here due to space 
limitation. 
3.5.2 The performance of shadow checking 
We have also conducted a set of simulations for shadow checking to investigate how repli­
cation architecture with unequal sized modules performs under the presence of soft errors 
following different error models. Errors were injected in the shadows as well as the main cache. 
Data items that are supposed to be identical under the normal condition were exposed to 
independent error injections and are compared for error checking. 
Figure 3.11 shows the average EPRs under shadow checking with two shadows. The results 
for two shadow sizes are compared. Clearly, larger shadow misses fewer errors. Note that the 
performance variation among different error models are similar to the case of parity caching 
(Figures 3.8c and 3.8d). The RARs of the shadow cache with 4KB shadows are 0.30 and 0.15 
for the I-cache and D-cache, respectively. In the case of 8KB shadows, the RARs are 0.55 and 
0.38, respectively. Here, we also observe the EPRs in the direct model are very low. but the 
same is not the case for the other models. However, we still confirm that shadow checking 
is very area efficient in all cases. If the designer needs to enhance cache reliability against 
the types of errors that require replication, but only a small area can be budgeted, then the 
shadow cache is worth considering. 
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Figure 3.11 EPR under shadow checking. 
3.5.3 The performance of selective checking 
Figures 3.12a and 3.12b show the relationship between average EPRs and the number of 
entries per set in the direct error model. With only half of the check code required for the 
uniform structure, EPRs of less than 4% are obtained. However, this is lower coverage than 
a parity cache of the same area can provide. The reason for this is that in selective checking, 
a Une is selected to assign check codes within the scope of a set rather than the entire cache. 
Recall that an advantage of selective checking is that it only needs a simple modification to 
the conventional architecture. 
From Figure 3.12c, unlike the first two checking schemes, we note that the protection 
coverage of two check codes per 4-way set varies very little under the three error models. This 
is also due to the fact that the check codes are managed independently for each set. Although 
EPRs are relatively high in the three models, they are still lower than 29%, which is much 
higher coverage than an intuitive expectation with about a half size check code array. This 
indicates that our locality-based checking scheme efficiently uses the given check code area. 
3.6 Summary 
In conventional architectures, as the size of the primary cache grows, the redundant code 
for data integrity checking also needs to be increased proportionally. We have proposed new 
architectural solutions for the situations where enough area cannot be budgeted to support this 
uniform organization and further expansion of the protection code. In our schemes, check code 
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Figure 3.12 EPR under selective checking. 
can be designed for a given area in such a way that the most frequently accessed cache lines, 
which are likely to be the most error-prone and are likely to have the lowest error propagation 
latencies, take precedence in integrity checking over less frequently used lines. Prediction for 
line selection is performed by taking advantage of locality in cache accesses. 
We have considered four possible error models and applied them to our simulated systems. 
From the simulation, we have found that with a% check codes of the uniform error checking 
architecture, the proposed schemes achieve far more than a% in error protection coverage. In 
particular, significantly low EPRs are obtained under the direct error model with a small area. 
We have also shown that adding the error scrubbing technique is more beneficial for a system 
with a small number of protection code entries. Parity caching and shadow checking schemes 
are more effective in the adjacent error model than selective checking. However, selective 
checking requires the simplest organization and management, and is thus easy to implement 
for multi-way set associative caches. Despite the unbiased error injection in time and location 
56 
in the random and column models, our schemes that are tuned for the protection of the MFU 
lines are still area effective for such error models. 
We have shown that our locality-based configuration schemes for the check codes can be 
adapted to current systems with a small overhead. An important advantage of the proposed 
architectures over the conventional uniform structure is the flexibility given to the system 
designer in planning cache systems of the desired capacity in terms of size and reUability. We 
have given an area estimate for the schemes based on an area model. In order to fidly validate 
the benefit of the schemes obtained from controUabiUty of area occupancy, the geometry of 
physical chip area in the VLSI design needs to be investigated further. 
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CHAPTER 4 Cache Write Verification in Multi-Level Caching Systems 
Due to the nature of reference locality, the CPU mostly communicates instructions and 
data with the first level on-chip caches. These are originally fetched from the secondary cache 
or memory with very low frequency. Thus, the guarantee of this initial fetch-and-write into the 
first level cache, which is rare but fundamental for correct future operation, is indispensable for 
a dependable caching system. This chapter presents a new cache write error detection scheme, 
called cache write sure or CWS, which exploits the preexisting information redundancy of the 
multi-level caching systems. The effectiveness of this detection technique is evaluated by using 
an on-the-fly trace driven simulation for thirteen benchmarks combined with software error 
injection. The results show that for most workloads, the CWS provides almost complete write 
error detection for a non-protected I-cache in a two-level on-chip caching system with a cache 
cycle time ratio between LI and L2 of 1 to 5. At the same time, it can also significantly 
enhance write error protection for the D-cache using the same hardware. 
4.1 Importance of Initial Data Transfer 
The frequently used portion of instructions and data is maintained in fast cache memories 
so that the processor can communicate with the caches rather than with slow main memory 
for most of the program execution time. As a larger portion of silicon area is devoted to 
on-chip caches, a higher probability of fault occurrence in the cache memory can be expected. 
Instructions or data items in the on-chip cache are likely to be accessed repeatedly until 
replaced in the case of a miss. If a certain transient fault corrupts the contents of a cache line 
during its initial write operation (fetching from the lower level memory or cache and copying 
to the on-chip cache), the subsequent references to the line would be erroneous and can cause 
further error propagation. In the case of a cache miss, memory components in both levels must 
operate properly for a correct initial write operation. By contrast, the CPU accesses only the 
on-chip cache on a cache hit. In practice, since cache hit ratio is considerably high for most 
applications with common on-chip cache sizes (e.g., 8-KB~2-MB), the frequency of this initial 
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data write is very low. Therefore, adequate protection against errors during the initial write 
operation is the first essential step in enhancing the dependability of the cache system. 
One common approach is to employ ECCs. In general, ECC is constructed across a certain 
number of bits in order to correct single-bit errors or detect double-bit errors. It is also possible 
to build an ECC for multiple-bit correction and detection, but the corresponding complexity 
of the circuitry and the amount of redundancy required increases excessively. Hence, ECC is 
not practical if a large number of bits or burst Une errors are expected. 
A bus protocol, caUed echo-back [90], was proposed to detect faults generated during cache 
operation. If either the bus master or bus slave writes an address on the bus, the other one 
reads it and then writes the sensed address back on the bus to verify the address transfer. 
The vaUdation of the data transfer between the master and slave is accomplished in a similar 
manner. The protocol is particularly useful in avoiding latent faults and multiple faults. 
However, the single cache read/write cycle time needs to be increased for the echo-back. A 
minimum degradation in the system performance under this protocol can be obtained only 
when the cache accesses are consecutive so that the verification time can overlap with the 
normal bus cycle. 
In [91], we developed an error detection mechanism, called shadow caching, to overcome the 
Umitations of conventional ECC. A 0.5~2 KB cache keeps the most frequently used portion of 
main cache lines and detects transient errors that have been generated during any operational 
phase including the initial write stage, which is of our specific interest here. 
In this chapter, we present a new hardware cache write protection scheme, named as cache 
write sure or CWS, in the multi-level cache systems using a FIFO type verification queue. To 
ensure that the initial write operation in the first level cache has been performed correctly, each 
newly updated line is also copied into a verification queue at the time of its first read access. 
While the CPU proceeds with its operation using the information from the first level cache, 
denoted by Ll cache, the cache controller performs the line verification cycle by comparing the 
corresponding data in the queue and the secondary cache, denoted by L2 cache. The CWS 
scheme is developed to remedy the insufficiency of ECC in cache write error protection. The 
scheme requires far less chip area and complexity than ECC. 
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4.2 Motivation 
As VLSI chips become denser, a larger chip area can be made available for the cache system. 
However, the monotonous increase in cache size or associativity cannot be an absolute solution 
because larger caches become slower. Multi-level cache hierarchy, therefore, is widely used 
[92], [93]. Some microprocessors even employ the two-level caching approach on a single chip 
[94]. For example, 96 KB and 32 KB L2 caches are implemented on the DEC Alpha 21164 
and PowerPC x704 processor chips, respectively. 
In the memory hierarchy, the main memory includes all the data of the upper level memo­
ries. Similarly, L2 cache typically includes all the information of LI. Notice that the informa­
tion redundancy is employed for system performance improvement. The basic idea of our work, 
the CWS scheme, is to exploit this existing redundancy for cache fault tolerance purposes. We 
compare the contents of a verification queue copied from LI cache against the contents of L2 
cache to check if the data items of an Ll line, which will be used many times by the processor, 
have been correctly fetched and written into the top level cache at the outset. This faithful 
incipient fetch-and-write must first be guaranteed for reliable future references. 
Table 4.1 Hit ratios (%) of 16 KB on-chip I-cache and D-cache. 
Benchmark name l-cache D-cache 
am2 99.996 97.816 
intmm 99.999 98.590 
num.conv 99.999 99.997 
pla 99.999 98.144 
roll.com 99.996 99.993 
state 99.998 99.998 
dhrvstone 99.999 98.602 
fft 99.999 49.163 
flops 99.998 99.990 
hanoi 99.997 99.995 
Unpack 99.999 91.883 
mm 99.999 89.292 
nsieve 99.999 86.846 
Table 4.1 shows the hit ratios of the on-chip instruction cache (I-cache) and data cache 
(D-cache) for thirteen benchmarks on a DEC Alpha AXP 3000. Each Ll cache provides the 
majority of requested program instructions and data in all cases except for fft execution. Specif­
ically, in the I-cache, there is an extremely small number of initial fetch-and-write operations 
since the hit ratio averages more than 99.9%. This indicates that once an I-cache line, which 
includes multiple instructions, is fetched, it is read many times due to the nature of instruction 
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reference. Note that most of the working set of instructions used during program runtime is 
not fetched from the L2 cache or memory, but from the Ll cache. Thus, during this period, 
the L2 cache can be accessed by other system components independent of the processor's op­
eration. By taking advantage of this idle period, the CWS technique will perform information 
comparison between the two copies of a cache line in the verification queue and in the L2 cache, 
thereby verifying the validity of the initial fetch-and-write operation. 
In the case of the D-cache, data write occurs more often than with the I-cache because 
the processor may repeatedly update the data of a D-cache location after the initial fetch. 
Moreover, it also has a slightly higher miss ratio than the I-cache in many cases. Therefore, 
we can expect that the number of verifications required to detect data write errors is higher. 
One interesting question here is whether or not the L2 cache is actually available for every 
data verification. In addition to the Ll misses, the processor's intrinsic write operations to the 
D-cache also increase the L2 cache traffic if a write through Ll cache is employed. We intend 
to answer this question with our simulation study. The CWS scheme targets almost complete 
protection for the I-cache. Using the same hardware resource, it also significantly enhances 
data integrity for the D-cache. 
4.3 Baseline Architecture 
Figure 4.1 shows the baseline architecture used to implement the CWS scheme. It consists 
of a verification queue, called write sure queue (WSQ) and a verification unit with look through 
Ll caches. The processing unit corresponds to a pipelined RISC CPU core. To allow parallel 
instruction fetches and data accesses, the Ll cache is conventionally separated into the I-cache 
and the D-cache. Those caches themselves are not ECC- or parity-protected. Since the I-cache 
does not copy back any instruction to the next level memory, no write strategy is required. In 
the proposed CWS scheme, the data coherency between the Ll and L2 should be maintained 
all the time because the data in the Ll is verified against the data in the L2. Thus, the D-cache 
uses buffered write through and write around policies that are easier to implement than write 
back with write allocate or invalidate [95], [96], which cannot guarantee the data coherency in 
the memory hierarchy. 
If a write hit occurs in the D-cache, both Ll and L2 caches are updated. The mixed L2 
cache with write back and write allocate policy can be either on- or off-chip memory and is a 
superset of the Ll cache without ECC protection. In order to minimize CPU wait time due 
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Figure 4.1 Baseline architecture for the cache write sure scheme. 
to the write operation to the L2, write queues are employed. This allows the CPU to continue 
its operation while the cache controller performs the data update. In case of a write miss on 
the D-cache, the incoming data item is written to the L2 cache directly with no change to the 
D-cache. As a result, an Ll cache write operation occurs only on a read miss or a write hit. 
Only two extra components, the WSQ and the verification unit, are added to a conventional 
non-protected cache system on the processor chip. We assume that the L2 data is error free 
because the goal of the CWS system is not the detection of L2 data errors but the data integrity 
checking in the Ll caches generated by transient faults in buses, control lines and/or RAMs 
during fetch-and-write operations. The L2 data itself is always considered correct, but it is 
possible for the L2 data items to become erroneous during transfer to the Ll. The WSQ is 
a FIFO device, and its dual input/single output external configuration makes it possible for 
both Ll caches to copy their tag and data to the WSQ at the same time. The queue internally 
consists of two buffers and provides only a single item per verification cycle to the verification 
unit. To increase integrity of tag and data items after the copy from the Ll cache, parity bit 
protection is used for each queue entry. An error signal Une is provided by the verification unit 
to inform the CPU of comparison result. 
4.4 Instruction and Data Verification 
In our baseline model, the CPU requests an instruction fetch from the I-cache every cycle. 
When a new instruction or data item is written to the Ll caches on a read miss or write hit, 
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an additional cache line status bit, denoted by verified bit, is set to zero in order to indicate 
that a cache line has been updated and its verification is required. During this operation, the 
CWS system performs no operation. 
Once the line is in the Ll cache, it is likely to be used in the near future because of reference 
locality. When an item (or subblock) of the line is requested, it is sent to the CPU without 
any delay. In the mean time, by sensing that the verified bit is zero, the tag and data portions 
of the entire line, which may or may not have been corrupted, are copied into the WSQ and 
the verified bit of the line is set to one. In addition, parity bits are computed and attached 
to the queue entry on the basis of a subblock. It is also possible to implement more secure 
protection code for each WSQ entry. In any case, the computations of protection bits are 
always accomplished in parallel, and therefore, no impact on critical path is incurred. The 
parity codes are used to check the integrity of the line copy in verification phase. 
Due to the limited capacity of the WSQ, the line copy may not always be possible. We 
denote the condition in which the queue entries are all occupied as queue full state. One 
possible solution is to make the processor wait until the verification unit finishes one line's 
verification, which will make room for one more entry at the tail of the queue. However, this 
increases overall program execution time. Since the minimization of the system performance 
impact is one of the goals of the proposed CWS scheme, the line copy-and-verification is simply 
postponed until a sufficient condition of the line copy, i.e., the tail of the queue is empty on 
its reference, is satisfied. In this case, the verified bit and queue status are not changed. The 
drawback of this strategy is that a line's verification can be completely missed if no other 
occasion arises for the verification before its replacement. To reduce the probability of the 
queue full state, more queue entries can be added, but it may or may not be really effective 
depending on the access pattern. We will discuss the effect of queue size on the error detection 
coverage of the CWS scheme based on the simulation results in Section 4.6.3. 
A new Ll cache line is verified only one time. Once the new line is copied into the verifica­
tion queue, its recopy is prevented by monitoring the verified bit on subsequent accesses. Since 
the Ll cache has the look through configuration, the bus between Ll and L2 caches is busy 
only in the event of an Ll miss and a write hit on the D-cache. A missing item in Ll cache is 
fetched from L2 or main memory and provided to the CPU and the appropriate Ll cache at 
the same time. If a requested instruction or data is found in one of the Ll caches, the L2 cache 
controller independently performs the data comparison between queue head and corresponding 
L2 line. A single line verification is achieved in two half entry verification cycles. If any error is 
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detected in the tag portion of the queue head when the parity code is checked, the verification 
is aborted and the entire entry is removed. If the stored parity bit does not match with the 
calculated parity of a subblock, the result of the subblock comparison is ignored during the 
verification cycle. 
The data verification of each half of the queue head takes longer than an Ll cycle time due 
to the relatively slow speed of the L2 cache. The cycle time for the L2 cache and a verification 
cycle are longer than the Ll cache cycle time. Since the L2 is larger in size, we assume that 
multiple Ll cycles are required for a single L2 cycle. The L2 cycle time consists of the following 
two components: 
^L2 cycle ~ *Ll miss penalty ^L2 access time 
= + krLl = (1 + k)rLl. 
where rLl is Ll access time, tL2 access time is the sum of tL2 probe + tdata transfer, and k 
is an integer larger than 1. In general, k is 2~5 and 5~10 for on- and off-chip L2 caches, 
respectively. In DRAM main memory case, k is normally 10~50. Since the verification time 
does not include mzss penalty ^ is bounded by the L2 cache speed, a period shorter than 
tL2 access time's assumed for the verification cycle for each half of the full line verification. 
This half verification time is denoted by THV-
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Figure 4.2 A timing diagram example of instruction verification. 
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Figure 4.2 illustrates a timing diagram example of the CWS operation for the I-cache where 
k and Tfjv are equal to 4 and each. A read miss on the I-cache generates a cache line 
fetch from address B of the L2 cache and a write into an Ll line according to the address 
mapping. On the next read cycle, the requested instruction's address is B+4, and the whole 
line (B~B+31 = 32 Bytes) is copied to the WSQ and is used for the instruction verification 
during the following four clock cycles in this example as the Ll provides instructions to the 
CPU without accessing the lower level memory. An entire line verification consisting of two 
half verification cycles (4i%i) is accomplished successively in this case. However, each of the 
half verification cycles (r#y) need not be adjacent. If the system bus and L2 cache are not 
free after the first half verification, the second half verification is postponed until the next 
available bus cycle. The parity bits, generated during line copy phase, are checked in each half 
verification cycle. 
An L2 cache access request may arrive from the processor while a verification cycle is in 
progress. In this case, two approaches, called preemptive and non-preemptive, are possible. 
Under the preemptive scheme, the CPU request overrides any ongoing verification cycle. The 
interrupted verification is resumed at the next available L2 idle cycle. In the second case, the 
ongoing verification cycle always continues. This increases the program execution time due 
to the increase in CPU wait cycles. However, it might be worth the delay if this expense 
prevents the CPU from using incorrect data or instructions. Besides, the preemptive policy 
is generally more complicated to implement than the non-preemptive one because it requires 
extra mechanisms for rescheduling. Once a verification cycle is interrupted, the data and tag in 
the queue have to be maintained at the same value. In this chapter, we examine and compare 
the detection coverage and overhead of both schemes. 
4.5 Evaluation Methodology 
We evaluated the proposed CWS scheme based on an on-the-fly trace driven simulation 
method using the ATOM tool [97]. The instruction trace of the entire program is instrumented 
for thirteen benchmarks on the Digital Alpha AXP 3000 Model 400. Table 4.2 shows the 
program description and instruction type distribution of each benchmark used. 
A direct-mapped cache was used for each Ll cache as recommended in [98] and 32 byte-lines 
were assumed for both the Ll and L2 caches. In order to obtain the advantages of two-level 
caching such as reduction in cache access time and dynamic allocation of instructions and data 
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Table 4.2 Characteristics of benchmark programs. 
Benchmark 
name 
No. of 
instructions 
Load 
(%) 
Store 
m 
Workload 
Description 
am2 10.5M 37.0 6.6 
iterative control loop programs from Boeing 
airplane company 
intmm 97.9M 17.4 5.9 
num.conv 36.0M 21.6 9.6 
pla 71 0M 50.0 7.2 
roll.com 9.4M 32.3 14.2 
state 34.1M 36.3 14.7 
dhrystone 58.8M 23.6 12.9 synthetic program intended to be representative 
for system integer programming 
fft 104.6M 12.7 11.9 fast fourier transform 
flops 108.3M 2.5 3.2 estimating MFLOPS rating for specific FADD, 
FSUB, FMUL, and MDIV instruction mixes 
(double precision) 
Hanoi 20.2M 25.0 20.4 integer program to solve the Towers of Hanoi 
puzzle using recursive function calls 
Unpack 565.0M 28.7 14.8 linear algebra routines of 100 x 100 matrices 
(rolled double precision) 
mm 683.4M 19.8 4.7 matrix multiplication (500 x 500 standard size) 
from T. Maeno 
nsieve 878.8M 12.7 9.6 integer program to generate prime numbers 
using a method known as Sieve of Eratosthenes 
(i.e., the ratio of instructions to data within a single L2 cache can be flexibly determined), the 
L2 cache size has to be much larger than the Ll cache. Since the verification cycle depends 
on the cycle time of the L2 cache rather than its size, we accommodated the size flexibly in 
accordance with the cycle time. We used two types of L2 caches and a main memory model 
in the memory hierarchy to examine the effectiveness of the CWS scheme. The L2 types and 
their cycle times used are two on-chip caches with cycle times of 47%!^ and 7t£i, two off-chip 
or external caches with cycle time of 13t£,i and 15rxi, and an external main memory of Glr^i 
with no L2 cache. 
To estimate the detection coverage of the CWS, we injected errors while a program was 
running. The error injection rate (EIR) was empirically determined to be about 0.1% and 
0.001% out of total number of write operations for I-cache and D-cache, respectively. Table 
4.3 shows the write rate on each Ll cache computed by 
, number of read miss _ 
write rate on I-cache(%) = : ; : — x 100, 
number of read miss + hit 
n , . number of read miss + write hit 
write rate on D-cache(%) = : : - ; x 100. 
number of read + write 
Since the write frequency on the I-cache is very low, the actual number of errors injected is 
also very small. This reflects rare error occurrence in real life. To measure the performance of 
l77.i: Ll cache cycle time 
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Table 4.3 Write rate on Ll cache. 
Benchmark name I-cache (%) D-cache (%) 
am2 0.0003 13.15 
intmm 0.0004 25.49 
num.conv 0.0010 30.77 
pla 0.0005 14.41 
roll.com 0.0043 30.60 
state 0.0011 28.82 
dhrvstone 0.0008 34.43 
fft 0.0006 82.91 
flops 0.0015 55.97 
hanoi 0.0027 45.00 
Unpack 0.0004 40.88 
mm 0.0001 28.91 
nsieve 0.0003 56.19 
the CWS, we mainly used write error detection coverage (WEDC), which is defined as 
WEDC(%) = of errors detected ^ m 
number of errors injected 
As discussed in Section 4.4, both bus management schemes, preemptive and non-preemptive, 
have trade-offs between the detection coverage and the CPU stall/scheduling overhead. Hence, 
for comparison purposes, we obtained the verification aborting ratio (VAR) for the preemp­
tive handling scheduling and the non-preemptive handling overhead, CPU stall per instruction 
(SPI). Each metric is computed as follows: 
T, . number of verification aborted V AR(%) = T-J— - : —= —j— x 100, 
number of Ll cache misses + u-cache write hits 
SPI(%) = NUMBER °F CPU CYCLES STALLED X 100 
number of instructions executed 
4.6 Simulation Results 
To show the effects of each parameter on the detection capability, we varied only one 
parameter at a time. Basic parameter values are 16 KB Ll cache, preemptive bus handing, 
THV = 2t£i, pipelined processor with seven stages, and four entries in the WSQ. 
4.6.1 Effect of secondary memory type 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the WEDC for I-cache with three types of secondary memories. The 
CWS scheme provides 100% coverage except for the two applications in the case of an on-chip 
L2 cache with THV = 277,1. Note that the number of errors injected is very small, and thus the 
failure of a single error detection results in a very large decrease in the detection percentage. 
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To obtain a more accurate detection rate, we can compute the average value of many runs 
with different error injection times or line locations all at the same value of EIR. However, 
this approach is time-consuming. As an alternative method, a heavy EIR can be used to 
compare the WEDCs although the error occurrence pattern is far from our expectation of the 
real situation. According to the simulation results, 26.6% increase and 1.1~10.8% decrease in 
WEDC was observed on num.conv and other workloads under around 10% increase in EIR, 
respectively. This difference in detection capability comes from the fact that the sensitivity of 
WEDC with respect to EIR becomes larger as the write rate on the Ll cache becomes smaller. 
WEDC (%) |l2x 13i B6k  D7x  W30it~| ( ): actual number of errors injected 
Figure 4.3 Effect of half queue verification cycle time on I-cache. 
When off-chip L2 is used (thv = 6t£,i or 7th), the WEDC fluctuates between 0~80%. The 
chip-to-chip communication is much slower than on-chip transmission. Obviously, the longer 
verification cycle can make the WSQ full, i.e., arrival rate is greater than the service time 
for the queue. In the case of external memory (THV — 30t/,i) as the instruction comparison 
source, the latency is very high in comparison to the Ll cycle time. Thus, no error detection 
is obtained in most program executions. 
Both Ll caches were always included in the memory system at each simulation run. As 
we observed in Table 4.3, data writes in the D-cache accounts for a substantial portion of the 
cache operations. Since a single WSQ is shared by the both Ll caches, we expected some 
impact of the D-cache write traffic on the WEDC for the I-cache. However, the CWS shows 
100% WEDC for the I-cache on eleven benchmarks in an on-chip L2 configuration, although 
the D-cache provides more cache lines to be verified due to its frequent write operations and 
its increased bus traffic between Ll and L2. From this observation we can draw an important 
feature of the CWS: the WEDC is independently determined by each cache's access pattern. 
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The D-cache might update its cache lines before they are verified in the event of additional 
write hits. This is because the real verification cycle always has a certain amount of delay 
after a read request arrives. The L2 cache controller needs to wait to start a new verification 
cycle regardless of the bus handling scheme. During this interval, new data might overwrite 
the error in the Ll cache. In this case, the corresponding entry of the WSQ must be also 
updated to prevent a misdetection. Furthermore, we could observe that many errors injected 
on D -cache are quickly removed because of both frequent write hits and read misses, where 
the corrupted line is overwritten by new data before the line is verified. 
( ): actual number of errors injected 
(350) 
(4*21) (10986) 
WEDC (%) 2x B3x D6x 
(1839) 
Figure 4.4 Effect of THV in accordance with three L2 types associated with 
D-cache. 
Figure 4.4 depicts the WEDC for the D-cache for various secondary memory systems. 
Even on-chip L2 cache with THV — 2t£,i shows poor error detection performance in many 
applications. Nevertheless, the CWS presents on an average of 57.9% WEDC on the D-cache 
using common system resources such as the WSQ and verification unit that are also used for 
the complete error detection on the I-cache. 
4.6.2 Effect of Ll cache size 
In general, as the Ll size becomes larger, its hit ratio also increases. Although increase in 
hit ratio obtained may be insignificant, the improvement in cache access time can be notable. 
The higher hit ratio allows the WSQ to achieve higher access to the L2 bus for verification. 
For several applications, Figure 4.5 shows this expected behavior. One reason of exceptional 
results on the I-cache for num.conv, hanoi, and Unpack is that the number of errors injected is 
very small as discussed in the previous section. 
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Figure 4.5 Effect of the cache size: (a) I-cache. (b) D-cache. 
In the case of the D-cache, the WEDC of larger caches is not always higher than that of 
smaller ones because different size caches cause distinct streams and frequency of data writes. 
The perfect error detection is possible only if all the verification requests from the Ll caches 
are performed successfully. If most of the requests arrive in a small interval, L2 is not available 
for the verification. The newly updated cache line may not be verified. Smaller caches generate 
more read misses and frequent data replacements while the larger caches provide a higher write 
hit ratio. More read misses or write hits on the cache require more frequent data verification. 
Thus, the congestion in verification unit and L2 bus may happen in any size of D-cache. 
In the two-level on-chip caching system, the Ll cache has a limited size because more chip 
area is needed for the L2 cache. A 16 KB or 32 KB is a common size for an on-chip Ll cache. 
Note that the CWS presents complete WEDC for 16 and 64 KB I-caches with L2 cache cycle 
times of 5TH and THV = 277,1 for most applications under 0.1% of EIR. 
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4.6.3 Effect of WSQ size 
WEDC (%) 
120 -
100 -
•2 entries B4 B8 Q32 064 
1  
I I  
(a) 
(b) 
Figure 4.6 Effect of WSQ size: (a) I-cache. (b) D-cache (each column of a 
benchmark indicates a different number of entries in the WSQ). 
One may think that the number of valid queue entries is a major factor in achieving higher 
WEDC. If the queue entries are not promptly verified and cleared, or if the queue size is too 
small, new cache lines cannot enter the queue for verification, which corresponds to the queue 
full state. Even if the queue has a large number of entries, it is still possible to reach the queue 
full state if the service time is slow. As a result, the queue size is not a critical parameter. To 
achieve a higher WEDC with a small number of queue entries, verification requests from the 
Ll caches must be evenly distributed during the program execution and minimum number of 
L2 bus cycle must be requested by the processor or Ll cache misses. 
We conducted a set of simulations with different queue sizes to examine its effect on error 
detection as shown Figure 6. For most applications, there is no remarkable performance 
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difference among various queue capacities. The results show that the verification performance 
of the CWS mostly depends on available L2 bus cycles rather than the queue size. The 
advantage of a larger queue is achieved only when a new cache line is copied and verified, 
as a smaller queue cannot accept the request due to the queue full state before the line's 
replacement. Many entries in a queue might increase mean time to detection (MTTD) in a 
certain case. The verification of a new line in the queue tail takes a longer time right after a 
queue full state in a large queue because more lines in the queue need to be verified first. From 
our simulation results, in the off chip L2 configuration {juv = 617,1 ), a 2-entry queue provides 
slightly better (on average 4.37%) error detection than a 64-entry queue. However, for most 
cases, a WSQ with only four entries accomplishes almost same error detection coverage as the 
larger capacity queues and occupies less chip area. 
4.6.4 Effect of bus management and degree of pipeline 
Table 4.4 Effect of bus management scheme. 
Cache type I-cache D-cache 
Benchmark numconv nsleve mm fft 
preemptive 66.70% 100.00% 59.10% 14.70% 
non-preemptive 100.00% 96.20% 51.80% 9.30% 
While the L2 controller performs the verification cycle with the data from the WSQ, no Ll 
cache misses are desirable if the bus is to remain free. If any L2 data or instruction request from 
the processor is issued, the controller has to decide to either continue the ongoing verification 
or to abort it, depending on system design requirements. We measured the WEDCs of two 
approaches, preemptive and non-preemptive. Different detection coverages were observed in 
only few cases as shown in Table 4.4 On the num.conv benchmark, non-preemptive detects all 
three errors injected during 36 million instruction executions with the SPI of 0.023 while the 
preemptive scheme provides little higher WEDCs on three applications. One possible reason 
for this is that in a non-preemptive mode, the holding time for an item is shorter than in the 
preemptive mode. The different queue holding time can change the sequence of verifications 
for newly written cache fines and thus result in slightly different detection coverage. 
Table 4.5 shows the VAR on each benchmark. It varies in a wide range along applications. 
Higher VAR indicates more overhead for resuming aborted verifications. The selection between 
these two schemes is not straightforward due to the different overhead nature of the two which 
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is beyond the scope of this chapter. But the system architect can make a decision based on 
preference because both handling methods show similar detection coverage in most cases. 
Table 4.5 Verification abortion rate (%) on preemptive bus handling. 
Benchmark VAR (%) 
am2 8.708 
intmm 0.633 
num.conv 6.955 
pla 11.264 
roll.com 3.001 
state 13.840 
dhrystone 7.897 
fft 6.897 
flops 0.032 
hanoi 22.220 
Unpack 24.583 
mm 15.937 
nsieve 6.079 
To study the effect of the degree of pipeline for the processor, five and nine stage pipelines 
were examined in addition to one with a degree of seven. The change in degree of pipeline may 
change the bus request timing because the D-cache access is shifted to a different CPU clock 
cycle after the instruction is fetched. However, it turned out that there is no difference in the 
WEDC on either cache in all three cases. 
4.7 Summary 
We have presented a new cache write error detection technique in multi-level caching sys­
tems. The CWS scheme detects all of the errors injected in the on-chip I-caches under the 
configuration of the on-chip L2 cache whose access time is no longer than double the Ll cycle 
time. Although the detection of corrupted data in the D-cache is limited, write error protection 
is simultaneously applied to both Ll caches due to their insignificant conflict in verification 
requests. Many microprocessors are equipped with an integral of multi-level caches because it 
is not uncommon for the system performance to suffer significantly without an effective cache 
hierarchy. Under this trend, the CWS can be more effective in write-and-fetch error detection 
for non- or insufficiently protected on-chip Ll caches. 
Simulation results showed that for most cases, both preemptive and non-preemptive tech­
niques for verification achieve almost the same detection capability. The major drawback of 
the CWS system is that it always has a certain amount of error latency. However, the CWS 
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can be more practical than other schemes such as multiplexed caching and ECC protection 
because it can detect any number of bit errors, needs minimal hardware addition, uses preex­
isting memory redundancy in the conventional multi-level caching system, and has less impact 
on system performance by exploiting system bus idle time. 
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CHAPTER 5 Oil-Line Integrity Checking for Control Logic 
Faults in the control logic of the microprocessor may result in incorrect execution of in­
structions and their sequence errors. This chapter presents a low-cost reliability enhancement 
strategy for the microprocessor's control logic, which usually remains unprotected against soft 
errors due to great overhead. We classify control signals into static and dynamic control de­
pending on their changeability. For static control, signals used in pipeline stages are integrated 
into a signature and verified with a cached check code at commit time. The concept of caching 
signatures is introduced. The effectiveness of dynamic control is examined in which the sig­
nals are created using component-level duplication. Fault injection simulations on a SimR2K 
processor demonstrate that our schemes can achieve more than 99% coverage on average with 
a very small hardware addition. 
5.1 Processor and Fault Model 
Our base processor is divided into two parts. The front-end fetches instructions from cache 
or memory and feeds them into the back-end. In the back-end, instructions are executed and 
the processor's architectural state is updated. To keep the execution engine busy, the front-
end may speculatively fetch instructions ahead. Depending on microarchitectural choices, the 
back-end can process a single or a group of instructions at a time either in or out of program 
order, and the number of pipeline stages and functional units varies. The processor always 
maintains the in-order and lookahead states correctly to support precise interrupts. 
Transient faults disturb the processor circuitry used in any pipeline stage for a short period. 
The error may cause the system to start malfunctioning instantly or in a later cycle. An error 
of one type can generate new errors of other types Figure 5.1 depicts an example of such an 
event. A noise upsets random logic producing a control signal for storing the result of addi into 
r2. This fault creates an erroneous control signal, inverting write to no write, in the decode 
stage, and the error is latent until it causes a failure in the write stage. Since the control signal 
does not enable r2 for an update, r2 retains the old value. If r3-t-4 differs from the old value, 
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Control signal ( write ) error _ Register write failure 
Error detection latency 
sddi r2.r3,« 
noise 
occurrence Fault duration 
Error detection f time 
If not detected, the error propagates 
Pipeline stage Generate Fetch Decode | Detect Execute Write 
Front-end Back-end 
Figure 5.1 An example of control signal error propagation in a processor 
pipeline. 
this illustrates the propagation of control error to data error. In case of reference to r2 in 
following operations, further propagation may be expected. 
Faults in control logic result in control signal errors. In particular, errors that incorrectly 
change the flow of program control are referred to as control flow errors (CFEs). Control signals 
of the processor fall into two types. One is a signal directly derived from instructions. Each 
field of an instruction becomes a unique signal to control particular processor components in 
planned pipeline stages. This type of control for a given instruction is always the same and we 
call it static control. The other type of signals called dynamic control is generated by run-time 
conditions. Thus these signals may vary for the same instruction. The state of components and 
the product of several static controls determine such signals, e.g., hazard detection, bypassing, 
etc. 
Since the circuit's susceptibility to faults vary from chip to chip and block to block within 
a chip, the number of circuit elements affected by a fault may vary accordingly; but a larger 
number could be expected for future processors [5]. The following transient fault model is used 
for our study. We assume that the faults occur randomly in terms of time and location. Faults 
cause signal inversion (1 —> 0 / 0 —> 1) with an equal probability. A fault results in a fc-bit 
error in a component, where k is dependent on the circuit's complexity and it can be as large 
as the output width of the component. When a fault is in action, additional faults may occur 
and impacts may overlap. However, the probability of occurrence of such cases is negligible. 
5.2 Integrity Checking Strategy 
For random logic, the common parity approach becomes ineffective since the logic output 
loses simple relation with the input parity. A different strategy is needed for control logic 
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Impact of control signal errors on pipelined instruction execu­
tions: (a) a sample program segment and (b) control flow de­
viated by a CFE in the base processor pipeline executing the 
example code (a). 
protection. Figure 5.2 shows a sample program running on the base processor pipeline. The 
pipeline is about to complete I\ and needs to ensure correct control in the earlier stages for 
the instruction. If there has been any error during I\ execution, its effect needs to be removed 
by this point; otherwise, the system state becomes faulty. 
A branch, /g, is mispredicted as taken and instructions starting I22 are speculatively ex­
ecuted. A control error occurs in the instruction pointer multiplexer of the front-end, and 
then propagates causing a jump to /31 after I23, which is not a branch instruction. This is 
a CFE. Fortunately, fall-through occurs in /g and instructions in the false flow are squashed 
before being committed. As a result, the effect of the CFE is eliminated as well. Errors 
may disappear without affecting the system state. Irrespective of the instruction scheduling, 
only instructions in true flow of program control are committed and need to be protected. 
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In this context, postponing the integrity checking till the last stage may be advantageous. 
This commit-time checking is suitable for the static control signals and also applicable to CFE 
detection if information required for verification is available at commit time. 
The commit-time checking for the dynamic control is difficult to implement. For example, 
Io is data-dependent on I\, but the bypassing unit forwards the result of /4 instead due to a 
control signal error. It is costly to carry these run-time conditions to the commit stage. Our 
protection strategy for the dynamic control is to examine the signals on the spot with check 
codes when they are created. Random logic for dynamic control is duplicated at component-
level or parity-protected if possible. 
5.2.1 Static control protection 
Unless there is an error, static control signals for a given instruction remain unchanged in 
every execution of the instruction. Once we know the correct signals, the integrity checking for 
static control logic is examining whether or not it produces and applies the same signals at the 
proper time. Our proposal is to transfer the signals used to the last stage in a compacted form, 
called signature, and verify the control with a pre-stored signature. The signature is an ra-bit 
wide code (SoSi...Sn-i) resulted from exclusive-ORing the static control signals throughout 
the pipeline. 
Figure 5.3a shows pipelined generation of a signature. Various symbols in the boxes repre­
sent different signals that drive operations in several stages. When an instruction is fetched, 
its signature starts to form. The generation and use of the control signals can occur in differ­
ent stages. As the instruction flows through the pipeline, signals actually used in a stage are 
integrated into the signature and the rest are passed to the next stage. When the instruction 
reaches the final stage, the signature generation is also complete. As a result, the signature 
manifests errors, if any, in the phases of the generation, transfer, and actual use of the static 
control signals. 
Figure 5.3b illustrates how the static control signals used in each stage (separated by dotted 
lines) during an instruction execution, are integrated into a signature. Static control signals 
in stage i are are numbered as C,j, j = 0,1,..., M — 1, where AT, is the total number of the 
signal bits in stage i. The signature is basically an even parity code. For t = 0,1, ...,n — 1, 
the signature St is defined by Cij with j mod n = t for all j, where denotes the sum 
modulo 2 for all i. In stage z, a fault causes a 4-bit error in adjoining logic. Since those four 
bits affect different signature bit locations, the final signature indicates the error. A small 
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Figure 5.3 Signature of static control signals: (a) pipelined signature gen­
eration and (b) an example of signature computation with an 
erroneous static control signal C,j. 
signature width n can cause error aliasing. A study on signature-based monitoring shows that 
8-bit signatures are sufficient to provide high coverage [100]. We choose n = 8 in this chapter. 
If Ni > n, j for each signal bit position in Cij is assigned in such a way that the signals from 
physically adjoining logic, which may be commonly affected by a single fault, are mapped to 
distinct values of t in generation of 5t. 
In order to verify a newly generated signature at commit time, a checking signature needs 
to be provided for comparison. To maintain the checking signatures economically, we propose 
to generate the signatures dynamically and store them in a small table, called signature table. 
General cache management is used for the table and we call this technique signature caching. 
For simplicity, the table starts with an empty state. No initial checking signatures are pre­
pared separately with preprocessing. On the first execution of each instruction, the run-time 
generated signature fills the table entry indexed by the instruction's address. This signature 
is used as the checking signature in later executions of the same instruction. Since the table 
has a limited size, it may replace old entries. 
In the commit stage, the table is searched for the corresponding checking signature in 
79 
parallel. Error checking for the static control is possible only on a table hit. In case of a 
fault detection, i.e., signature mismatch, the pipeline is flushed and the program counter is set 
to the address of the committing instruction again for recovery. The execution resumes with 
re-fetching of the instruction. The processor already includes this kind of recovery mechanism 
to support speculative execution. If the checking signature is erroneous, signature mismatch 
persists during the recovery procedure. Unless checkpointing [3] mechanism is employed, the 
execution restarts from the beginning. Although signature table misses may still occur after 
the initial phase, high reference locality provides favorable performance of the small signature 
table. The proposed scheme requires no compiler modification for embedding signatures and 
causes no pipeline stalls for error checking. 
5.2.2 Dynamic control protection 
A signature of dynamic control signals can keep changing even for the same instruction. 
Thus, the mechanism used for the static control is not applicable. Employing a parity predic­
tion scheme for a random logic block can cost as much as duplication. It may be possible to 
redesign the logic in such a way that correct output combined with some redundant output 
always meets a predefined condition for verification purpose. However, it is hard to guarantee 
a solution for all random logic, which is more advantageous than duplication in terms of error 
coverage and overhead. 
In our strategy, we choose to duplicate the dynamic control logic at component-level. For 
any given unit block in the processor chip, dupUcation is used only for the dynamic control 
part of the unit that is otherwise difficult to check. For example, bypass and predicate control 
logic selects the output of multi-level bypass multiplexers in the integer unit. Such dynamic 
control logic is duplicated, while data path including the multiplexers are ECC-protected and 
static control signals are encoded into a signature. This minimizes chip area overhead for 
the integrity checking in comparison to full duplication of the integer unit. Separate checking 
mechanisms employed for different parts of the unit are complementary. 
The two outputs of the duplicated logic are compared on every cycle. In case of a mismatch, 
the comparator promptly asserts error detection before erroneous signals are latched in the 
pipeline register. The recovery takes place without discarding any instruction in the pipeline 
and stops instructions from moving forward. Each pipeline stage repeats the same operation. 
The recovery time depends on the duration of the transient fault in the logic. The effect of a 
transient fault may last a few clock cycles. 
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In order to optimize protection capability with a limited area, a selective protection can be 
made based on the priority obtained from the fault sensitivity information of the logic. The 
fault sensitivity of logic components was discussed in Chapter 2. 
5.2.3 Control flow monitoring 
Errors in both the static and dynamic control logic may result in a CFE. CFEs can be 
classified into four types. The processor may take a jump before completing the current basic 
block. The jump can be taken to either the beginning (Type I) or a non-entry point of any basic 
block (Type II). CFEs can also occur during a branch. The processor may start to execute a 
new, but wrong basic block (Type III) or jump to the middle of any basic block (Type IV). 
Control flow monitoring (CFM) techniques detect CFEs. In traditional CFM schemes [99], 
[100], each basic block is associated with a signature, e.g., the checksum of the instruction 
stream, which is prepared before program execution. This signature is compared with the 
run-time generated signature at every exit point of basic blocks. Any jump from a non-exit 
point or to a non-entry point causes a discrepancy between two signatures, achieving error 
detection. However, CFEs of Type III are undetectable with this approach. 
nPC 
CPC 
Hit 
\Comp / \Comp / 
bubble 
NAR < 
Error flag generation 
Signature 
table 
Figure 5.4 Block diagram of IA-based CFM hardware. 
In our proposal, the CFM becomes a simple check, comparing the addresses of instructions 
being committed. Figure 5.4 shows the block diagram to implement our instruction address 
(IA)-based CFM scheme. The signature table is combined with the CFM hardware. When 
the processor executes an instruction, it maintains the address of the next instruction to be 
executed, denoted by nPC. Unless a branch occurs, nPC points to the next contiguous location 
in the current basic block. In the case of branch, nPC is updated with a branch-resolved target 
address in an earlier pipeline stage, and passed along with the instruction's address (cPC) and 
81 
signature (sig-in). In this way, nPC at commit time indicates the scheduled control flow. 
Annulling an instruction in a pipeline stage sets bubble to 1. 
On completion of an instruction's commitment, nPC is stored in a register, NAR. When 
the next instruction is ready for commitment, its cPC is compared with NAR to check whether 
or not the instruction is from the correct flow. In case of a mismatch, i.e., CFE detection, 
the pipeline is flushed and the execution resumes from the instruction addressed by NAR. 
The signature table is also accessed with the address in NAR to check the run-time signature, 
sig_in. If bubble is 1, NAR is not updated and no error flag is raised. If a fault affects both 
nPC of the branch instruction and cPC of the next instruction (we call this case common fault), 
the fault cannot be detected. This can happen if the nPC and cPC originate from the same 
component. However, the shared component is protected with ECC or duplication. It should 
be noted that the IA-based CFM covers all the types of CFEs described above. This run­
time checking can be performed outside the critical path, resulting in negligible performance 
penalty. 
5.3 Evaluation Methodology 
Fault injection simulations were conducted on a SimR2K processor that we built using 
Verilog HDL. SimR2K is an RTL model of MIPS R3000 32-bit CPU core. It was chosen 
because the architecture was generally known and auxiliary tools for design verification and 
benchmark generation were available in public domain. SimR2k incorporates the proposed 
protection schemes, and error checking takes place concurrently when a program is running. 
Considering scalability and RISC characteristics of SimR2K, testing the proposed strategy on 
SimR2K is reasonable to assess its performance in modern microprocessors. Under our fault 
model, component-level dupUcation provides 100% protection coverage for the dynamic control 
logic. Thus, the dynamic control protection was not separately tested. 
Software simulated faults, based on the model described in Section 5.1, were injected in the 
control logic of the processor at run time. For each logic component, fault injection locations 
(FILs) are identified after grouping fault equivalent gates together. SirnR2K includes a total 
of 70 FILs (36 for static control logic, 17 for dynamic control logic, and 17 for data path). The 
complete FIL Ust is presented in Table 5.1 with the output of each logic block. We denote 
FILs by numbers and classify them by logic type and protection scheme. 
Four appUcation programs of various algorithms were used as a benchmark suite: Hanoi, 
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Table 5.1 The complete list of FILs in SimR2K: logic blocks are grouped 
by type and protection scheme. 
| FIL | Output signal Component or operation | FIL | Output signal Component or operation 
I Name I Width affected by a fault in FIL 1 Name 1 Width affected by a fault in FIL 
Signature caching protected 1 IA-ba*ed CFM protected 
1 zero_or_instr 32 instruction 37.. pc_in 32 PC, branch 
2 extd data 32 operand, branch 38 IDFIush 1 instruction 
3 Br addr 32 branch 3». BrFlaq 1 flow control 
4 Lui 1 operand, branch I 
5 SignBit 1 operand, branch 1 Component-level duplicated 
6 HiLoSel 1 operand 40. IDRsSel 2 operand 
7 ReglmmSel 1 operand 41 IDRtSel 2 operand 
8 mfhi 1 operand 42 wrt num 5 register data 
9 mflo 1 operand 43 Stall 1 pipeline stall 
10 RegDst 1 register data ... 44: RsSel 2 operand 
11 Link 1 register data 46 RtSel 2 operand 
12 ALUOp ALU , 4S DatalnSel memory data 
13 WithOV 1 interrupt/halt 47 MorW 1 operand 
14 Exit 1 interrupt/halt '•'•'48:-: MulDiv 1 operand 
15 RtlmmSel 1 operand . 48 ByPass 1 operand 
16 IDDataSt 1 memory, dependency 80 ExcptFlush 1 flow control 
17 IDDataLd 1 operand 51 PipeRegWrt 1 pipeline stall, operand 
18 DataSign 1 operand 52 InstMemStall 1 pipeline stall, operand 
19 DataSize operand 1 53 1 DataMemStall 2 pipeline stall 
20 MemToReg register data 
21 RegWrt 1 register data I ECC protected 
22 ial 1 dependency control hijojmmdjn 32 operand 
23 i 1 dependency control lo_reg_in 32 LO register 
24 jalr 1 dependency control hi_reg_in 32 HI register 
25 jr 1 dependency control hi or lo 32 operand 
26 Controlln 18 control logic reg_rs_out 32 operand 
27 dst_reg register data reg_rt_out 32 operand 
28 HiLoWrtSel 1 HI/LO register rt_data_in 32 operand 
29 HiWrt 1 HI register Jr addr 32 operand, branch 
30 LoWrt 1 LO register lo data in 32 LO regsiter 
31 ALUCtl 4 ALU hi data in 32 HI register 
32 MEMCtlln 12 control logic st data 32 memory data 
I rs alu in 32 operand 
I Signature caching and IA-based CFM protected I rt_alu_in 32 operand 
33 pc_4 32 next sequential PC immd_bypass 32 operand 
34 BranchOp 3 branch data in 32 memory data 
35 Jumplmm 1 branch WB_reg_data 32 register 
36 JumpRs 1 branch Id data 32 operand 
Static control logic Dynamic control logic 
Data path 
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Intmm, Heap, and Queens. All benchmarks were written in C and compiled with a cross-
compiler, dlxcc [101]. When a benchmark program runs on SimR2K, a single fault injection 
is performed into a targeted FIL at a randomly selected clock denoted by fault injection 
point (FIP) for one clock cycle. Multiple FIPs are examined for each FIL independently, and 
the number of FIPs is determined by the experiment time limit and desired accuracy of the 
measurement. 
Table 5.2 Outcome classification of fault inject run. 
Case Error Program termination Result & system 
state comparison Effect of error 
Program.failure 
Not detected, but not 
effective 
8 Detected by IA-based CFM 
10 
Detected by signature 
caching 
before T 
after T 
a t T  
after T 
match 
None or 
negligible 
Easy to recover 
Hard to recover 
On completion of each benchmark run in the presence of a fault, the outcome is evaluated by 
a comparison with the precomputed correct results and final architectural state. Table 5.2 cate­
gorizes possible outcomes of the benchmark run with a fault injection into 10 cases. We assume 
that program always fails after T+500 cycles, where T is the normal execution time of each 
program. A continuous run is forcibly stopped at T+500. If a fault is not detected (Case 1~7), 
a failure may or may not occur. Undetected faults that cause the program execution to fail 
are our major concern. Therefore, we measure the performance of the proposed schemes with a 
fault protection coverage computed by (number of successful runs/number of fault injection runs)x 
100% = (1 - £Li Case i/£j° i Case j) x 100%. 
5.4 Experiment Results 
The combination of the signature caching and the IA-based CFM covers 39 FILs (36 static 
and 3 dynamic control logic blocks) as shown in Table 5.1. The redundancy added for that 
is only a 512-byte table (2-way set associative cache with 64 signature entries of 8 bytes) and 
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Figure 5.5 Fault coverage for the benchmarks: outcome distribution also 
shows error detection coverage. 
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small supporting logic. The remaining 14 FILs of dynamic control are checked with component-
level duplication. The area of control logic blocks that can be protected by each technique 
changes for different processor architectures. However, compared to the unit- or system-level 
duplication, the hardware overhead is very minimal. For SimR2K, we expect roughly 60% 
reduction in gate counts. 
The coverage of the signature caching can be affected by the processor's run-time behavior. 
The signature caching cannot perform integrity checking in the case of a table miss. To make 
its small hardware addition meaningful, its fault coverage needs to be considerably high. Figure 
5.5 presents the performance of the signature caching collaborating with the IA-based CFM 
for four benchmarks. For each FIL on x-axis, the coverage shown was obtained for faults at 
100 FIPs. As clearly seen from the figure, most signals are completely covered. On average, 
no more than 1% of injected faults result in a failure for all benchmarks. This is mainly the 
result of two factors: 1) locality in instruction execution is generally high and 2) not every 
undetected fault generates a critical error, disturbing program execution. Possible error of this 
coverage estimate is less than 7% in all cases for a 95% confidence level. 
The distribution of fault injection outcomes, based on Table 5.2's classification, is also 
shown. Interestingly, benchmarks have common general tendencies in the distribution. This 
indicates that the characteristics of control logic are more important than the program being 
executed with respect to the effect of faults. Table misses are responsible for faults that are not 
covered in the signature caching. The coverage loss of the IA-based CFM in FIL 37 corresponds 
to the common fault cases described in Section 5.2.3. This appears because ECC protection 
for the common source was not included in the simulation. 
Faults missed by the signature checking may be captured by the CFM, and vice versa. 
The reason that Case 9 is always dominant over Case 8 is that any case where the signature 
caching and the CFM detect the same error was counted as the coverage of the signature 
caching. Most of Case 10, i.e., error checking with an incorrect signature in the table, can 
be observed in FILs 1 and 33. Therefore, once an error is detected by our mechanisms, the 
recovery is usually simple. 
5.5 Summary 
We have presented a comprehensive integrity checking strategy for the control logic of 
microprocessors, which is a hard-to-protect area. The scheme is devised after examining the 
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effects of faults on the processor and the characteristics of the control logic. Control signals 
are classified into static and dynamic control and separate protection approaches are applied. 
We have introduced the concept of caching signatures for the static control protection. By 
exploiting locality in program code, this technique significantly reduces the overhead required 
in traditional signature-based checking while providing high protection capability. In addition, 
commit-time checking eliminates unnecessary checking in earlier stages and allows us to use 
the existing mechanism for recovery. Our IA-based CFM technique can detect all four types of 
CFEs with the assistance of the signature caching whereas conventional methods cover three 
types only. For the dynamic control protection, we change the replication from a large unit-
level to a minimal component-level. This can take advantage of selective redundancy allocation 
based on the fault sensitivity of the control logic. 
The proposed techniques simultaneously achieve our goals of 1) low-cost, 2) high fault cov­
erage, and 3) easy recovery. We expect that its performance penalty is small. Our schemes 
and the current techniques are complementary to the full integrity checking of microproces­
sors. Hence, incorporating the proposed techniques will significantly enhance the processor's 
dependability. 
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CHAPTER 6 System Level Fault Tolerance for Superscalar Processors 
This chapter proposes an integrity checking architecture for superscalar processors that 
can achieve fault tolerance capability of a duplex system at much less cost than the traditional 
duplication approach. The pipeline of the CPU core (P-pipeline) is combined in series with 
another pipeline (V-pipeline), which re-executes instructions processed in the P-pipeline. Op­
erations in the two pipelines are compared and any mismatch triggers recovery process. The 
V-pipeline design is based on replication of the P-pipeline, and minimized in size and func­
tionality by taking advantage of control flow and data dependency resolved in the P-pipeline. 
Idle cycles propagated from the P-pipeline become extra time for the V-pipeline to keep up 
with program re-execution. For a large-scale superscalar processor, the proposed architecture 
can bring up to 61.4% reduction in die area and the average execution time increase is 0.3%. 
6.1 Virtual Duplex System 
For high-end servers that require high reliability and availability, replication at unit- or 
system-level is often considered to be the ultimate solution for fault tolerant processor design 
[103], [104]. This approach can provide 100% error detection without introducing much design 
complexity. A major drawback of the system-level replication is high additional cost, and this 
usually restricts its use. Even if a sufficient die area can be budgeted for multiple proces­
sor modules, power dissipation issue may be an obstacle in some applications. To cope with 
the increasing reliability concern for a broader range of microprocessors, it is desirable to de­
velop more affordable integrity checking mechanisms with good fault coverage and performance 
characteristics. 
This chapter presents an inexpensive fault tolerant architecture for modern superscalar 
processors. The main idea is to exploit idle cycles in the processing core for its integrity 
checking with a serial verification core. When instructions are ready to be committed in the 
original core, the verification core re-executes them to detect any errors. Since two cores are 
connected in series rather than in parallel, a significant hardware optimization in size and 
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functionality is achievable for the verification core. This is called a selective series duplex 
(SSD) architecture. We develop our proposal by suitably modifying existing architectures 
with the following goals in mind: 1) to provide the protection capability of a duplex system, 2) 
to minimize hardware requirement for duplication, 3) to maintain the maximum performance 
of the original core, and 4) to keep design and verification complexity very low. 
6.2 Fault Manifestation in Microprocessors 
Soft errors manifest temporary environmental disturbances such as power jitter, electro­
magnetic interference, cosmic rays, etc. Figure 6.1 illustrates an example of the transient fault 
occurrence in a small logic block of a processor chip. A neutron-hit creates a burst of electronic 
charge in the circuitry of a NAND gate, which changes the gate output from 1 to 0. Continuous 
correct input signals make the gate recover at the output since no irreversible physical damage 
has been done. This recovery may take several clock cycles as the amount of the noise burst 
increases. If the output is latched before the recovery, it may propagate to other components 
and eventually cause a computation failure. If cosmic rays hit a memory cell, its logic value 
may be flipped and remain erroneous until new value overwrites it. 
Fault behavior is random. Faults can occur in any component of the processor at any point 
of operation and they may affect the circuit very shortly or permanently in diverse ways. The 
circuit's susceptibility to the faults is not the same even within a logic block. Accordingly, the 
number of components affected by a single fault changes. Moreover, the situation may vary 
with the systems and operating conditions. It is impractical to make a processor completely 
tolerant to all such randomness of faults. Instead, we can define a fault model based on the 
likelihood of different cases and develop a system under that fault model. The first assumption 
is that a fault in a component only appears as the inverted output signal, high to low or low 
Volts Recovery 
Fault duration 
Figure 6.1 Transient fault manifested in a logic output of a processor chip. 
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to high with an equal probability. Also, a fault can corrupt multiple bit signals simultaneously 
and more than one such faults may be active at the same time. We assume that the probability 
of fault occurrence is uniformly distributed over time and location. 
Duplication is one of the simplest approaches that can match up to this fault model. 
Since effective faults are manifested in outputs, without considering intermediate processes 
only final outputs need to be checked and the comparison is a very efficient method for that. 
Two operations and results that are replicated at the system-level eliminate any limit on 
detectable number and types of faults unless a failure is identical in both modules. Duplication 
evenly provides fault tolerance capability for every component. However, it is not effective in 
the case of common failures. The comparison element is a single point of failure. Thus, it 
needs to include a totally self-checking mechanism [105]. Physical division is preferred to 
reduce the probability that a single fault results in a common failure. Independent faults in 
two modules may produce identical faulty outputs, but the probability of occurrence of such 
events is expected to be very low. All architectures discussed in this chapter adopt a form of 
replication, and therefore the same fault criteria should be used to assess their fault coverage. 
6.3 SSD: Selective Series Duplex Architecture 
We apply hardware replication with a different organization to combine the benefits of 
existing fault tolerant designs into the SSD architecture. Figure 6.2a shows the organization of 
the IBM S/390 G5 microprocessor [103], in which the CPU core is duplicated in a conventional 
way. The two CPU cores are configured in parallel and operate in lock-step to compare the 
outputs in every cycle before going to the LI cache and the register unit (R-unit), which 
are shared and ECC-protected. This architecture is robust in error detection and easy to 
implement. However, it utilizes resources inefficiently. Both cores always perform exactly the 
same operations irrespective of their usefulness. For example, if a branch misprediction occurs 
in one core, the identical misprediction is also made in its counterpart. This is not to verify 
the prediction, but to keep the two cores synchronized. In fact, faults in prediction logic, 
causing a misprediction, do no harm to the execution integrity. If the pipeline in one core 
generates pipeline stalls, the other pipeline produces the stalls at the same cycles. A lot of 
hardware resources and CPU cycles are wasted just for design simplicity. It should be noted 
that operations involved in executing instructions that are not committed, i.e., not in the real 
control flow, need not be checked. 
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Figure 6.2 (a) A conventional fault tolerant processor with a dual CPU 
core, (b) Fault tolerance using re-execution through a single 
multithreading processor core. 
Instead of duplicating the processor, integrity checking can be accomplished by executing 
each program twice through a single core. If multithreading is used, the primary and secondary 
executions can be overlapped [106], [107], [108]. Figure 6.2b depicts an organization for this 
approach. Each program and its copy are treated as independent threads and executed in 
parallel. Only completed instructions during the primary execution are sent to the buffer along 
with the results. The secondary execution is performed by taking instruction entries from the 
buffer that may also include the control and data flow information of the primary execution. 
Utilizing such information can make the secondary execution simpler. The processor may make 
use of idle cycles of one thread for another thread to reduce execution time. Although this 
dynamic re-execution architecture achieves fault tolerance, the program execution time still 
increases by 5~30% even with a significant addition of execution engine. Since a single pipeline 
is shared with both threads, the actual optimization for the secondary execution is less than 
expected, and thus re-execution time cannot be completely absorbed away. One important 
lesson from here is that the redundant execution overhead can be minimized by utilizing idle 
resources. In [28], augmenting the commit phase of the processor pipeline with a checker was 
proposed for functional verification in microprocessor designs. This approach however uses a 
heterogeneous checker that may require large design and verification overhead. Besides, the 
checker is unrealistically assumed to be fault free. 
Efficient integration of redundant execution into the pipeline is a key issue to realize in­
expensive fault tolerance. Our proposal is to duplicate the pipeline for the re-execution in a 
selective way and configure it in series. Figure 6.3 illustrates the proposed organization where 
the original CPU core, P-pipeline, is combined with an optimized duplicate, V-pipeline, in 
sequence, forming one long pipeline. The P-pipeline is a conventional superscalar processor 
core with precise interrupt handling. The verification core of the V-pipeline is created from the 
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P-pipeline after removing unnecessary front-end logic including branch prediction and prefetch 
hardware, IP generation MUXes, etc. To keep the complexity minimum, the V-pipeline reuses 
the P-pipeline design as much as possible. Furthermore, the V-pipeline is down-scaled through­
out all the processing units such as buffer, decoder, ALUs, and so on. A minimal hardware 
addition is required to support efficient re-execution and error checking. 
REQ •» CPU core Verification core (optimized) o ° 
Figure 6.3 Selective series duplication (SSD). 
A FIFO type buffer, called re-execution queue (REQ), is inserted between the two processing 
cores. When an instruction is about to be committed in the P-pipeline, the REQ takes the 
instruction along with its result and provides them to the verification core. Although the 
P-pipeline can complete instructions in out of program order, instructions are buffered in 
commit order, which makes the hardware simple and maintains an instruction stream with 
free of control flow hazard. The execution results in the REQ are also used to immediately 
resolve data dependency, if any, in the decode stage of the V-pipeline. If the REQ is full, it 
cannot receive any new instructions and the commitment in the P-pipeline is delayed. This 
is the case where the re-execution may increase the execution time. Therefore, the V-pipeline 
should be able to process queued instructions fast enough to keep room available in the REQ. 
Each load or store instruction requires two operations, effective address calculation and 
cache or memory access. Extra memory ports for the verification purpose may be too expensive. 
The SSD architecture requires no additional memory ports. Effective address is checked by 
means of dual computations like other instructions and actual memory access occurs only once 
for each memory instruction. The P-pipeline loads data into its registers as usual, while it 
stores data into a store buffer instead of the memory. On the other hand, the V-pipeline 
does not access the memory for a load, but it finally stores data into the memory if the data 
item stored in the store buffer by the P-pipeline matches with the data being stored by the 
V-pipeline. As a result, real load and store memory accesses are performed in the P-pipeline 
and V-pipeline, respectively. Because data and instructions in the memory are protected with 
an ECC, errors are checked on every read access. 
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Fault detection is achieved by executing each instruction twice consecutively, and the two 
results are compared before committed to the architectural state in the V-pipeline, i.e., com­
mit time checking. This means that the V-pipeline always maintains a correct check-pointed 
processor state. The commit time checking prevents errors from propagating to the processor 
state. Although the two pipelines are not identical in size, they produce the same results under 
the fault free condition. If a fault is detected, both pipelines are flushed and a subroutine call 
carries out a rollback recovery. 
P-pipeline V-pipeline 
• execution error • 
z 
mil r3 rl r2 
1024 transfer error Vv 1024 
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rl cub r4 ( r5) rl 
Figure 6.4 An example of instruction execution and error detection in the 
SSD pipeline. 
Figure 6.4 shows a small program segment being executed in two pipelines of a SSD pro­
cessor. During the primary execution in the P-pipeline, because of data dependency on r3 and 
r5, instructions i + 1 and i + 2 should wait until instruction i of a long latency is completed. 
On the other hand, in the case of the V-pipeline instructions i + 1 and i + 2 can be executed 
immediately, since r3 and r5 are transferred from the P-pipeline via the REQ. If the execution 
of instruction i in the P-pipeline is erroneous, the subsequent instructions in the both pipelines 
become incorrect. However, the re-execution of instruction i in the V-pipeline detects the error 
before the other instructions are committed. A faulty data transfer, i.e., r5 corruption in an 
REQ entry, is detected by the result comparison of instruction i + 2 in the V-pipeline. 
The characteristics of the proposed SSD architecture are as follows. The V-pipeline needs 
to execute only instructions in the actual flow of program control that are passed from the 
P-pipeline for verification. Since the V-pipeline never executes instructions speculatively, it 
requires no speculation hardware and processes fewer instructions than the P-pipeline. The 
V-pipeline takes advantage of the dependency hints and execution results pre-resolved and 
transferred from the P-pipeline to avoid dependency-induced pipeline delays. The P-pipeline 
can hardly sustain its maximum throughput and its stall cycles propagate to the V-pipeline. 
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Exploiting this idle cycle makes it possible for the V-pipeline to have fewer functional units 
than the P-pipeline without degrading performance. The V-pipeline may start re-execution 
as soon as a completed instruction is ready for commitment from the P-pipeline, and the 
execution may be in out of program order for a speed up. The multithreading support is 
not necessary for the re-execution. The latency for each instruction's commitment increases 
due to expanded pipeline, but on the whole it is only a small initial delay and operations are 
mostly overlapped. The penalty for a misspeculation remains the same because the speculative 
execution is still verified in a P-pipeline stage, causing no impact on instructions being executed 
in the V-pipeline. 
6.4 Evaluation Environment 
We have modeled the SSD architecture in simulation software and examined its perfor­
mance impact and hardware cost compared with non-redundant baseline processors. The SSD 
processor simulator was developed from the simplescalar tool set [109] mostly by replicating 
necessary processor blocks for the V-pipeline. The baseline processor is configured for high 
throughput with wide-issue, out-of-order superscalar, and branch prediction. 
Table 6.1 lists standard parameters used in our evaluation. The baseline processor includes 
only one CPU core (P-pipeline) and memory system. The SSD processor comprises the baseline 
and a V-pipeline, which is a down-scaled version of the P-pipeline. To test the SSD architecture 
for a range of superscalar processors, we fixed the baseline configuration into three classes, large-
scale, mid-scale, and small-scale, while varying the scales of the V-pipeline for each baseline 
class. The table enumerates the V-pipeline parameter values examined. Optimal configurations 
of the V-pipeline could be found through extensive simulations. For the sake of presentation, 
each configuration of the V-pipeline is denoted by a sequence of parameter values in the order 
of REQ size (q), decode/issue/commit bandwidth (d/i/c), register renaming/updating unit 
(r), load/store queue (1), and functional units. For example, 8-4/4/4-64:16-4/1/3/1 denotes a 
V-pipeline with the same configuration of the small-scale P-pipeline described in Table 6.1. 
For each selected SSD configuration, the processing speed of benchmark programs was 
measured by execution-driven simulations and the corresponding chip area overhead was es­
timated. We used seven SPEC95 programs, pisa big-end binaries obtained from [110]. The 
simulator was compiled on a Sun Ultra-10 under SunOS 5.7. We ran each benchmark on the 
simulator for 200 million instructions with inputs shown in Table 6.2. The performance metric 
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Table 6.1 The baseline and SSD processor configuration. 
Parameters 
Baseline CPU core (P-plpeline) V-pipeline 
large-scale mid-scale small-scale Various scales 
Instruction fetch queue 
(instr. entry) 16 16 8 
Re-execution queue 
(REQ): 2. 4, 8, 16 
Decode 1 issue / commit 
bandwidth (instructions/cycle) 8 / 1 6 / 1 6  4 / 8 / 8  4 / 4 / 4  1,2.4,8/1.2.4.8/1,2,4,8 
Reorder buffer (instr. entry) 256 128 64 4. 8. 16. 32. 64, 128 
Load/store queue (instr. entry) 64 32 16 2, 4, 8, 16. 32 
Functional 
units 
intALU 6 4 4 1.2. 3, 4. 5 
int MUL/DIV 2 2 1 1 
fp ALU 6 4 3 1.2. 3,4 
fp MUL/DIV/SQRT 2 1 1 1 
Branch mis-prediction penalty 
(cycles) 8 no penalty 
Branch prediction gshare with 2048 entries 16-bit global history no prediction needed 
Memory hierarchy 
L1 instruction cache 64KB, 2-way, LRU, 8 instructions/block, hit/miss=2/12 cycles 
L1 data cache 64KB, 4-way, LRU, 32B/block, hit/miss=2/12 cycles, 2 read/write ports 
L2 unified cache 1MB, 4-way, LRU, 64B/block, hit/miss=10/60 cycles 
of our interest is relative execution time (RET) that is the total execution cycle ratio of the 
SSD processor to the baseline processor for a given program. 
Besides presenting only simulated values for the parameters in Table 6.1. we also make an 
estimation of the die area using an area breakdown shown in Table 6.3. This provides us better 
insight into the area requirement for the SSD. The area factors are determined on the basis 
of the die area distribution data for four commercial microprocessors [111], [112], [11], [113]. 
The area factor is the relative die area of unit functional block with respect to a single entry 
of the instruction fetch queue. For example, the area factor of a 4-instruction wide decoder 
is 99.9. Both the P-pipeline and V-pipeline include separate 128 integer and 80 floating-point 
Table 6.2 Benchmarks and input files. 
Benchmark go li peri hydro2d swim tomcatv waves 
Input tile 9stone21 in test.lsp primes ref train train test 
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Table 6.3 Die area breakdown. 
Functional block Ana factor 
Baseline processor ana estimate 
large-scale mid-scale small-scale 
Instruction fetch queue 1.0 16.0 16.0 8.0 
Re-execution queue (REQ) 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Instruction decode 25.0 199.8 99.9 99.9 
Instruction issue 25.0 399.6 199.8 99.9 
Instruction commit 5.0 80.0 40.0 20.0 
Register renaming/update 2.7 703.7 351.9 175.9 
Load/store queue 2.7 175.9 88.0 44.0 
Integer ALU 29.3 175.5 117.0 117.0 
Integer MUL/DIV 35.1 70.2 70.2 35.1 
Floating point ALU 56.4 338.3 225.6 169.2 
Floating point MUL/DIV/SQRT 99.7 199.3 99.7 99.7 
Integer register file 0.5 64.0 64.0 64.0 
Floating-point register file 0.7 57.6 57.6 57.6 
Speculation unit 70.3 70.3 70.3 70.3 
Total 2550.3 1499.9 1060.5 
registers. A common area factor of the speculation unit is used for all configurations. The 
table lists total area factors for three baseline processors. The additional area requirement for 
a SSD processor is the total area factor of the V-pipeline divided by the total area factor of the 
P-pipeline. Here the requirement is considered in comparison to a traditional duplex system. 
6.5 Cost Reduction and Performance Impact 
Two important goals of the SSD architecture are substantial cost reduction in building a 
duplex system and negligible performance overhead. This section evaluates the architecture in 
those terms with the simulation results. Figure 6.5a shows the RETs of the large-scale SSD 
processors, in which the large-scale baseline is checked by the V-pipelines of different sizes. The 
line graph denotes the area requirement for the V-pipelines scaling up from 21.7% to 61.7%. 
When it becomes 38.6%, the average RET is 1.003. Further up-scaling to 51.4% reduces the 
maximum observed RET to near 1 (0.9% execution time increase for swim). These results 
indicate that a V-pipeline with only 38.6% area of the P-pipeline is capable of re-executing all 
the instructions retired from the P-pipeline without slowing down the processor much. This 
happens because the number of instructions that the V-pipeline needs to execute is usually 
less, whereas the P-pipeline may consume its resources in processing incorrectly speculated 
instructions. More importantly, the P-pipeline can be stalled by control and data hazards, but 
that is not the case in the V-pipeline. As a result, the re-execution is faster than the primary 
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execution and requires less hardware resources. The P-pipeline delays virtually correspond to 
extra cycles that the smaller-sized V-pipeline may take to keep pace with it. 
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Figure 6.5 The RETs of the large-scale SSD system: (a) Effect of scal­
ing V-pipeline. (b) RET for each benchmark (V-pipeline: 
8-8/8/8-128:32-5/2/4/1 of 61.7% area). 
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Figure 6.6 The RETs of the mid-scale SSD system: (a) Scaling 
V-pipeline. (b) RET for each benchmark (V-pipeline: 
8-4/4/4-64:16-3/1/2/1 of 61.9% area. Note this case is not 
shown in (a)). 
We have found that increasing REQ size from 4 to 64 can bring an average 0.9% RET 
reduction. However, in general increasing the V-pipeline on the whole with a balance is more 
effective. Figure 6.5b presents the RET for each benchmark on a SSD processor with a V-
pipeline of 61.7% area. Interestingly, for some benchmarks execution time on the SSD is less 
than that on the baseline processor. The average RET is less than 1, and 3.5% performance 
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Figure 6.7 The RETs of the small-scale SSD system: (a) Scaling 
V-pipeline. (b) RET for each benchmark (V-pipeline: 
8-2/4/4-32:8-2/1/2/1 of 69.7% area). 
improvement is observed in the case of tomcatv. The reason for this is that additional buffering 
for store provided by the V-pipeline helps to avoid slowing down the processor when all memory 
ports are busy. In the baseline processor, if a store cannot be committed due to lack of memory 
port, the commitment of the subsequent instructions is also delayed even if they are ready. On 
the other hand, store accesses are immediately passed to the V-pipeline in the SSD unless the 
REQ is full. While actual store accesses are buffered in the load/store queue of the V-pipeline, 
memory ports may become available and stores are serviced at commit time in the V-pipeline. 
It should be noted that the frequency of such a case is affected by the benchmark nature and 
other V-pipeline parameters as shown in Figure 6.5a: the minimum RET fluctuates in spite of 
increase in the load/store queue size. 
The overall resource utilization of the large-scale baseline processor might be lower than 
that of smaller-scale baselines, but the greater hardware resources can exploit more instruction 
level parallelism, resulting in a higher throughput. Our claim here is that a lot of redundant 
resources in a superscalar can be excluded when the processor is replicated for reliability 
enhancement. Figure 6.6 shows RETs of the SSD system built on the mid-scale baseline. The 
SSD approach still achieves the goals: only 64% area of the mid-size P-pipeline is enough to 
implement a V-pipeline that can maintain the average RET of 1.013. When a V-pipeline of 
61.9% area is applied (Figure 6.6b), the performance improves a little for swim, and the average 
RET is 1.015. The simulation results of the SSD with the small-scale baseline are shown in 
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Figure 6.7. In this case, it takes 79.3% area to obtain the average RET of 1.002. As seen 
from the graphs, relative area requirement for the SSD increases for the smaller scale baseline 
processors. This is due to decreasing redundant resources in the smaller baselines at the 
cost of lowered performance. However, the actual size of an optimal V-pipeline for desirable 
performance is in fact reduced by 7% and 17% for the mid-scale and small-scale baseline, 
respectively. This is expected because the baseline of a decreased throughput requires less 
processing capability of the V-pipeline. 
6.6 Summary 
Low cost reliability enhancement techniques are needed to deal with increasing fault rate 
in deep submicron microprocessors. In this chapter, we have developed a new fault tolerant 
architecture for modern superscalar processors, SSD, which economically realizes a virtual 
duplex system for increased dependability. The SSD architecture bases hardware duplication 
approach to exploit its robustness in integrity checking. The underlying idea is to organize the 
original CPU core, P-pipeline, and its verification counterpart, V-pipeline, in series instead of 
in parallel. This allows the V-pipeline to take advantage of the idle cycles and pre-execution 
results from the P-pipeline in its fast re-execution for error checking. As a result, hardware 
resources required for the V-pipeline can be minimized. 
We have demonstrated that our SSD approach can effectively achieve the following goals. 
• Duplex-system-like fault coverage. Since operations are performed twice through two 
pipelines for the instructions in the actual flow of program control, it can detect any soft 
errors as well as permanent faults unless they are in a common failure mode. Besides, the 
commit time error detection makes it possible to adopt existing misspeculation recovery 
mechanism as error recovery. 
• Considerable hardware cost reduction. We have obtained optimal V-pipeline configu­
rations with an average RET of near 1 for three sampled classes of baseline processor. 
Estimated area reduction is 61.4% for the large-scale, 36.0% for the mid-scale, and 20.7% 
for the small-scale baseline in building a SSD processor. The scalability of the SSD ar­
chitecture also enables the trade-off between performance and reliability depending on 
chip area budgeted. 
• Negligible performance overhead. Our cycle accurate simulation results show that RETs 
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quickly decrease as the V-pipeline is scaled up. The average execution time increase 
incurred by the above optimal V-pipelines is only 0.3%, 1.3%, and 0.2%, respectively. 
e Low design and verification efforts. The V-pipeline is built mostly with the same design 
of the P-pipeline functional block, minimizing design overhead. This re-usability also 
applies in the test sense. 
Considering presented advantages, we believe that the SSD architecture is worth considering 
in designing future fault tolerant microprocessors. 
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CHAPTER 7 Future Work 
We will continue to focus on cost-efficient and flexible fault tolerance schemes. Our fu­
ture work includes extended measurement and analysis of the fault sensitivity using various 
classes of processor chips. Criteria to analyze the fault sensitivity of different logic blocks 
will be further elaborated. We will investigate the sensitivity data at multiple levels of design 
hierarchy and develop low-overhead methods for fault sensitivity prediction. If the sensitivity 
is easily predictable, time consuming fault simulations are not required. We will also verify 
the practicability of sensitivity deduction from the processor architecture. We will develop a 
comprehensive guideline for redundancy allocation with which the designers can intelligently 
optimize protection capability. 
In order to fully validate the benefit of the schemes presented in this dissertation, the ge­
ometry of physical chip area in the VLSI design needs to be investigated. We will completely 
implement our architectures in the RTL model and synthesize to measure exact area effective­
ness of the techniques for different major processor models. The impact on the processor's 
normal operations will also be examined through simulations. We will conduct fault injec­
tion experiments and estimate the fault coverage for more diverse fault models to include all 
possible scenarios in the actual system. 
For system-level approaches, we will explore system on chip practices and investigate re­
usability in design and verification. In addition to scaling, other optimizations for faster 
re-execution will be a part of our future work. 
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CHAPTER 8 Concluding Remarks 
In this dissertation, a study has been conducted to understand the microprocessor's sen­
sitivity to transient faults and develop low-cost fault tolerance techniques. The proposed 
run-time integrity checking and error recovery may make it possible to use more chips in a 
wafer of a low yield with fewer testing and validation processes. This eventually enables the 
microprocessor manufacturers to ship more chips per unit time. 
Our fault injection study on the picoJava-II and SimR2K processor demonstrates that there 
are many functional blocks with very low sensitivities. The fault sensitivity is determined by 
architectural functions, logic characteristics, and active cycles. If we exploit the fault sensitivity 
information, cost-effective dependability enhancement may be easily achievable. 
For memory protection, we have proposed parity caching, shadow checking, and selective 
checking mechanisms for the situations where enough area cannot be budgeted to support the 
conventional uniform organization of the protection codes. We have shown that our locality-
based configuration schemes for the check codes have a great flexibility of area utilization in 
optimizing protection capability. We have also developed a new cache write error detection 
technique in multi-level caching systems. Our CWS scheme provides almost complete coverage 
for the I-cache without interfering with the normal memory access. 
For control logic, a hard-to-protect area of the microprocessors, we have presented a com­
prehensive integrity checking strategy. Our schemes take advantage of unique characteristics 
of the control logic. The signature monitoring and information caching are combined to ex­
ploit locality in program code. This technique significantly reduces the overhead required in 
traditional signature-based checking and provides more than 99% protection coverage. Our 
schemes and the current techniques are complementary to the full integrity checking of the 
control logic. 
Finally, our SSD architecture for modern superscalar processors has shown that realizing 
a virtual duplex system is still possible with much less hardware resources compared to the 
conventional duplication. Estimated area reductions are 61.4%, 36.0%, and 20.7% for large-
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scale, mid-scaJe, and small-scale baseline processors, respectively. The corresponding average 
execution time increases are 0.3%, 1.3%, and 0.2%. This advantage is obtained from a simple 
modification, from parallel to series, in pipeline organization. 
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